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ABSTRACT 
The study aims to investigate criminal jurisdiction of the visiting SADC armed 
forces during peace time focusing only on the Republic of Botswana and the 
Republic of South Africa. Since the adoption of the Declaration and Treaty of 
SADC, the armed forces of both Botswana and South Africa at times find 
themselves on each other’s territory. Once in each other’s territory the 
question of criminal jurisdiction becomes imperative. The two countries seem 
not to agree on the content of status of force agreements while cooperating in 
terms of the SADC Treaty. The contentious point is that the death sentence is 
still a competent sentence for certain offences under certain circumstances in 
terms of Botswana laws, whereas in South Africa the death sentence was 
declared unconstitutional. In the absence of any agreement, South African 
armed forces may face a death sentence while in Botswana and Botswana 
authorities might not be able to carry out a death sentence over their 
members for offences committed while in South Africa. In trying to answer the 
question of criminal jurisdiction while on each other’s territory during peace 
time, a study of the evolution of jurisdiction is undertaken. The laws of both 
countries are considered, especially the application and protection afforded by 
their respective constitutions. The approach followed by the UN in sending a 
peace-keeping force to conflict areas is analysed. A micro-comparison of 
agreements concluded by selected countries, more especially the NATO 
agreement, is undertaken. Treaties as a source of international law are 
analysed to show that rights can be extended and be limited by agreement. 
The study concludes by recommending that concurrent criminal jurisdiction 
with certain qualification seems to be the accepted norm and compromise 
amongst the international community, and that the two countries may consider 
this approach as the basis for such agreement. 
Key words: Botswana, South Africa, BDF, SANDF, armed forces, state 
sovereignty, criminal jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, limited jurisdiction, 
SoFA. 
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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THE VISITING SADC ARMED FORCES 
OVER THEIR MEMBERS DURING PEACE TIME. A CASE STUDY OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
It is generally accepted under customary international law, based on the 
principle of state sovereignty,1 that states have criminal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on their territory either by citizen or foreign nationals.2 
Before the Nuremberg Trial,3 states could exclusively exercise their sovereign 
rights; i.e. sovereign equality and territorial integrity, but the Nuremberg 
Charter pierced the veil of state sovereignty,4 by holding those who committed 
atrocities during World War II within their territory responsible.5 During 
peacekeeping operation conducted under the UN, the sending state retains 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its forces for all crimes committed on the 
receiving state’s territory.6  
There seems to be uncertainties as to who would exercise criminal jurisdiction 
during peacetime where states enter into bilateral and/or regional agreements 
in which members of their armed forces are sent to member states for the 
purpose of conducting training and force preparations exercises. The sending 
state would like to retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction for administration and 
discipline purposes over its members, whereas the receiving state would like 
to assert its sovereignty by retaining exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all 
                                                 
1
 Sovereign Equality, Territorial Integrity and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. 
2
 Reisman (ed) The Library of Essays in International Law: Jurisdiction in International Law 
(1999) at 32. 
3
 Military Tribunal established by the Allied Forces to try Germany Nazi Leaders for Atrocities   
committed during World War II. Available at 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nuremberg.htm  (Date used 05/11/12). 
4
 Broomhall International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty 
and the Rule of Law (2003) at 21. 
5
 The Allied Forces held Nazi Germany leaders responsible for atrocities committed on 
German citizens (mostly Jews) and non-citizen (civilians and prisoners of war) especially for 
those crimes committed in the concentration camps on German territory. 
6
 UN (General Assembly) 45th session: Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace keeping operations in all their aspects: Model status-of-force agreement for peace-
keeping operations (hereinafter Model SOFA) par 47(b). Available at 
www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup09/basicmats/UNsofa.pdf (Date used 05/11/12). 
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people within its territory. The receiving and the sending state will normally 
regulate each other’s relationship in what is generally referred to as the Status 
of Forces Agreement.7 Currently there is no status of force agreement 
amongst the Southern African Development Communities (hereinafter SADC) 
states as envisaged in the Declaration and Treaty of SADC, hence the 
important of this research.8 
In furtherance of Chapter III, Article 52 of the UN Charter,9 Southern African 
countries adopted the Declaration and Treaty of SADC10 (hereinafter the 
SADC Treaty) wherein their relationship with each other was established. In 
terms of Article 5(1) (c) of the SADC Treaty one of the objectives of SADC is 
to promote and defend peace and security. Pursuant to the SADC Treaty; 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African 
Development Community Region11 (hereinafter the SADC Protocol) was 
adopted to give effect to the SADC Treaty on matters of politics, defence and 
security.  
The preamble to the SADC Protocol states that the Heads of State agree to 
recognise and affirm the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, 
interdependence, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs of 
other states. Further Heads of States are determined to achieve solidarity, 
peace and security in the region through cooperation in matters of politics, 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. The Model SoFA regulates relationship between the UN and host nation during UN 
peace keeping operation in the host country’s territory. Where states enter into 
bilateral/regional agreements during peace time for training and force preparation purposes, 
the legal status of the members is regulated in subsequent status of force agreement. 
8
 See n 10 and 23 infra. 
9
 Article 52 of the UN Charter: The Charter encourages the establishment of Regional 
Treaties/Agreements and the settlement of dispute in that particular region via these 
Treaties/Agreements before being referred to the UN. The purpose of these Regional 
Treaties/Agreements should be in line with the principles of United Nations. Available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf (Ddate used 21/10/12). 
10
 SADC Treaty was adopted in 1992 and came into force in 1993. Member states are: 
Republic of South Africa, Republic of Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kingdom of 
Lesotho, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mauritius, Republic of 
Mozambique, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Republic of Zambia and Republic of Zimbabwe. Available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/subregional/docs/sadc8.pdf (Date used 23/10/12). 
11
 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (hereinafter the SADC Protocol) was adopted in 
Malawi (Blantyre) on 14 August 2001. Available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3812/9916/0245/sipo_en.pdf (Date used 23/10/12). 
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defence and security.12 In terms of Article 2 of the SADC Protocol, the general 
objective of the Organ shall be to promote peace and security in the region, to 
promote regional and coordination and cooperation on matters related to 
security and defence and to establish appropriate mechanism to achieve this 
end.13 
Subsequent to the aforesaid, a Memorandum of Understanding Amongst the 
Southern African Development Community Members State on the 
Establishment of Southern African Development Community Standby 
Brigade14 (hereinafter SADC MoU) was signed wherein member states 
agreed that a SADC Standby Brigade (hereinafter SADCBRIG) should be 
established. In terms of Article 8 of the SADC MoU, member states shall 
contribute military, police and civilian personnel to the SADCBRIG. Article 13 
of SADC MoU provides that training of personnel and units for the SADCBRIG 
is the responsibility of each member state. It further provides that the required 
level of training proficiency for personnel and units assigned to the 
SADCBRIG shall be achieved by the standardised training objectives and 
common training standard. The training shall include training at national and 
multi-national level.15 
In fulfilment of the SADC Treaty, the SADC Protocol and the SADC MoU, 
member states schedule and participate in multi-national exercises on any of 
the member state’s territory16 and/or sent individual or small groups of soldiers 
to attend training-related developmental courses on any of the member state’s 
territory. If we take the Republic of Botswana (hereinafter Botswana) and the 
Republic of South Africa (hereinafter South Africa), the two countries always 
                                                 
12
 Preamble to the SADC Protocol. 
13
 Article 2(1) and (2)(d) of the SADC Protocol. 
14
 Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the SADC Brigade (hereinafter the 
SADC MoU came into effect in August 2007. Available at http://www.paxafrica.org/areas-of-
work/peace-and-security-architecture/peace-and-security-architecture-documents/mou-on-
the-establishment-of-the-sadc-brigade (Date used 23/10/12). 
15
 Article 13 of the SADC MoU. 
16
 Exercise Golfinho (SADC peace support operation field training   exercise) from 1-26 
September 2009 conducted in SA Army Combat Training Centre, Lohatla in the Northern 
Cape Province. Available at 
http://www.dod.mil.za/media/media2009/Movement%20of%20troops%20and%20vehicles%2
0for%20Exercise%20Golfinho.pdf (Date used 13/09/2012). 
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send individual or groups of soldiers to attend training-related courses and/or 
exercises on either country, in order to achieve a common training standard.17 
South Africa and Botswana are signatories to the Southern African 
Development Community Protocol on Extradition (hereinafter the SADC 
Extradition Protocol).18 In terms of the SADC Extradition Protocol, member 
states agree to co-operate in the prevention of crime and to increase easy 
access to free cross border movement. The offences covered under the 
SADC Extradition Protocol are those that are punishable under both state 
parties by imprisonment of one year and more. The SADC Extradition 
Protocol provides that extradition will be refused if the offence for which 
extradition is requested constitutes an offence under military law, which is not 
an offence under ordinary criminal law.19 It further provides that extradition 
shall be refused if the person whose extradition is requested would be 
subjected in the requesting state to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.20 
In terms of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 (hereinafter the SA Defence Act) the 
South Africa National Defence Force (hereinafter the SANDF) is mandated to 
participate and cooperate in regional and international peace and security 
initiatives. The SA Defence Act further states that any agreement between 
South Africa and any other state or international institution must provide for 
the legal status of members of the SANDF and the legal status of the foreign 
military personnel who are deployed in South Africa.21 The SA Defence Act 
further provides that the foreign military personnel have authority over their 
members in matters concerning discipline and administration, provided that no 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment may be meted out or administered 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 The Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition (hereinafter SADC 
Extradition Protocol) was ratified on 14 April 2003 and came into force on 1 September 2006. 
Available at http://www.sadc.int/files/3812/9916/0245/sipo_en.pdf (Date used 23/10/12). 
19
 Article 4(c) of the SADC Protocol on Extradition. 
20
 Article 4(f) of the SADC Protocol on Extradition. Other grounds for refusal to grant includes 
but not limited to, where judgment was rendered in absentia, where there is final judgment 
rendered against the person and where request for extradition is based on race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion, sex or status or that the person's position may be 
prejudiced for any of those reasons (Article 4 of the SADC Protocol on Extradition). 
21
 Section 92(a) of the SA Defence Act. 
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by a military court or other authority while in South Africa.22 The SA Defence 
Act therefore authorise members of SANDF and Foreign Armed Forces to 
participate and cooperate in international and regional training initiatives and 
exercises, however it (SA Defence Act) left the legal status of members of 
SANDF to be regulated by future agreements. It further provides for limited 
exclusive jurisdiction for the visiting foreign armed forces. 23 
In terms of section 6 of Botswana Defence Act 13, 1977 (hereinafter 
Botswana Defence Act) the President may order that the whole or any part of 
Botswana Defence Force (hereinafter BDF) be employed out of or beyond 
Botswana. Furthermore, the President may order members of BDF to undergo 
training or for duty or employment outside Botswana24 or be placed at the 
disposal of other military authorities of any country.25 Section 116(4) further 
provides that military authorities shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction in 
relation to offences under Botswana Defence Act at all times when the person 
alleged to have committed an offence against this Act is serving outside 
Botswana. This means that Botswana will retain criminal jurisdiction for 
offences committed outside Botswana. By further including the words ‘at all 
times’ appears to suggest that Botswana intends exercising exclusive 
jurisdiction irrespective of the location or the type of offence committed by a 
BDF member.  
1.2 Problem statement 
In light of the legal framework discussed above, the question arises as to 
which of the member states will exercise criminal jurisdiction in the absence of 
any agreement if a soldier commits a crime. If we adhere to strict respect for 
sovereignty,26 and use Botswana and South Africa as a case study, then the 
receiving state has jurisdiction, (whether jurisdiction is exclusive or limited will 
be analysed in later chapters) it means: 
                                                 
22
 Section 97(1)(a) of the SA Defence Act. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Section 7(1) of Botswana Defence Act. 
25
 Section 7(2) of Botswana Defence Act. 
26
 Ibid n 1 supra. 
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a. A South African soldier who is in Botswana is going to be tried by 
the Botswana court under Botswana law. If for example the said 
soldier is convicted of murder he/she might face capital punishment. 
b. If a Botswana soldier commits the same crime (murder) while in 
South Africa and he/she is tried in South Africa under South African 
law he/she is protected from capital punishment. 
c. Therefore, a Botswana soldier is more protected than his/her South 
African counterpart if he/she commits a crime in South Africa, while 
a South African soldier is in a worst situation if he/she commits a 
crime in Botswana. 
The SADC Treaty, the SADC Protocol, the SADC MoU and the SA Defence 
Act do not provide for the legal status of their personnel. They left the 
question open to be addressed by future agreement. Currently there is no 
agreement between member states as to which state will exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.27 However, it appears that there is consensus amongst the SADC 
member states that a sending state has limited criminal jurisdiction where an 
offence is committed by a member of a sending state in the course and scope 
of performing official duties.28 The contentious point is as follows: Which state 
will exercise criminal jurisdiction where a member of a sending state commits 
an offence outside the scope of his/her duties – is it the sending or the 
receiving state? 
In trying to answer the aforementioned questions, an analysis of (amongst 
others) the SADC Treaty, the SADC Protocol, the SADC MoU, the Draft 
SADC SoFA, the agreement entered into by the government of South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, the agreement entered into by South Africa and the African 
Union in sending troops to Sudan and Burundi,  the agreement between the 
                                                 
27
 There is no consensus between Botswana, South Africa and Zambia (Minutes of the SADC 
Attorney General’s meeting from the Republic of Botswana, South Africa and Zambia dated 
11 July 2012: Department of Defence International Relations) (South Africa’s position is that 
South Africa should retain exclusive jurisdiction. Legal opinion provided by Department of 
International Relation and Cooperation, Office of the Chief State Law Advisers (International 
Law) dated 10/07/2012). 
28
 Article 5 of draft agreement regarding the status of SADC standby force or their armed 
forces deployed within the region for the purpose of training, exercise and humanitarian 
assistance. The agreement is not yet finalised due to lack of consensus on some of the 
articles specifically on jurisdiction (hereinafter Draft SADC SOFA [Soft law]). (Department of 
Defence International Relations). 
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United Nations and the Government of Mozambique on the Status of the 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (hereinafter ONUMOZ)29 and United 
Nations Mission in Somalia (hereinafter UNOSOM II)30 will have to be 
undertaken.  
The evolution of state sovereignty focusing on sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and criminal jurisdiction will be looked at, the approach adopted by 
the UN in sending peacekeeping force in conflict areas will be analysed and 
by analogy try and adopt the same approach. 
A comparative study with Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces (hereinafter NATO SoFA),31 the 
UK, and the USA will be undertaken. The SA Defence Act, Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999, the SADC Extradition Treaty, 
Botswana Defence Act and Botswana Penal Code will be analysed.  Lastly, 
the aforesaid will be measured against the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter SA Constitution 1996), specifically against the 
supremacy of the Constitution,32 the right to life,33 the right not to be treated or 
punished in a cruel, inhumane or degrading way34 and the Constitution of 
Botswana35, specifically the right not to be deprived of the right to life 
intentionally except in the execution of a sentence of court in respect of an 
offence under the law in force in Botswana.36 
 
                                                 
29
 Botswana contributed troops to this UN peace keeping mission. Mozambique facts and 
figures. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozF.html. (Date 
used 31/07/13). 
30
 UNOSOM II was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 
26 March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Botswana contributed 
troops to this mission. Available at 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2mandate.html. (Date used 
01/08/13). 
31
 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their 
Forces (hereinafter NATO SoFA) of 19 June 1951. Available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm (Date used 13/10/12). 
32
 Section 2 of the SA Constitution 1996. 
33
 Section 11 of the SA Constitution 1996.  
34
 Section 12 of the SA Constitution 1996. 
35
The Constitution (summary) of Botswana was adopted in September 1962. Available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/c_Botswana.pdf (Date used 29/10/12). 
36
 Section 4(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. 
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1.3 Hypothesis 
There is a need for regional cooperation between the SADC states in matters 
of defence and security as manifested in the signing of the SADC Treaty. An 
agreement detailing the legal status of a deployed soldier specifically in 
respect of criminal jurisdiction has to be drafted in order to settle the question 
and give certainty to the sending state and the soldier concern. The legal 
status of deployed soldiers who commit offences has to be settled specifically 
with regard to criminal jurisdiction as this can result in serious human rights 
violation for the soldier concerned.  
1.4 The framework of the dissertation 
The dissertation will consist of eight chapters divided into various topics in the 
following format: Chapter 1 will be an introduction. In Chapter 2 the nature 
and evolution of criminal jurisdiction will be analysed. I will focus on sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity and criminal jurisdiction as a sub-species of state 
sovereignty.  
Chapter 3 will be the discussion of Chapter III, Article 52 of the UN Charter, 
the Convention on Privilege and Immunities of the United Nations, the Model 
for Status of Force Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations, SADC Treaty, 
The Protocol, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of Republic of Zimbabwe 
concerning the Secondment of the Air Force of Zimbabwe Personnel to the 
South African Department Of Defence,37 Memorandum of Understanding 
between the African Union and the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa contributing Military Resources to the African Union Special Task Force 
in Burundi,38 Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and 
                                                 
37
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Government of Republic of Zimbabwe concerning the Secondment of the Air force of 
Zimbabwe Personnel to the South African Department Of Defence (Memorandum was signed 
on 17/11/05 and aim is to train South African Air Force Pilot). Available at 
http://196.14.41.167/dbtw-wpd/images/20051117ZimbabweMOUAirForce.pdf (Date used 
27/11/12). 
38
 Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa contributing Military Resources to the African Union Special Task 
Force in Burundi (Memorandum was signed in 05/05/04). Available at 
http://196.14.41.167/dbtw-
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the Government of the Republic of South Africa contributing Military 
Resources to the African Union in the Sudan39 and the Draft SADC SoFA (soft 
law) specifically on matters of jurisdiction.  
Chapter 4 will be the analysis of legislation regarding status of armed forces 
and/or personnel abroad, the Defence Act 42 of 2002, Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999, the Extradition Act No 67 of 1962, 
the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition40 and 
Botswana Penal Code.41 Case law will also be analysed.  
In Chapter 5 the constitutions of South Africa and Botswana will be analysed. 
The following rights will be discussed (in addition to the issue of constitutional 
supremacy)42 the right to life,43 the right not to be treated or punished in a 
cruel, inhumane or degrading way44 and the right not to be deprived of the 
right to life intentionally except in the execution of a sentence of court in 
respect of an offence under the law in force in Botswana.45 Case law 
regarding the aforementioned rights will be analysed. 
The study will concentrate on Botswana and South Africa as the two countries 
seem not to agree on the content of Article 5 of the Draft Status of SADC 46 
and the right to life47 is protected without any qualification in South Africa even 
                                                                                                                                            
wpd/images/20040505BurundiMOUAfricanUnionMissioninBurundi(AMIB).PDF (Date used 
27/11/12). 
39
 Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa contributing Military Resources to the African Union in the Sudan 
(Department of International Relation and Cooperation) (Date 27/11/12). 
40
 Ibid n 18 supra. 
41
 Botswana Penal Code. Available at 
http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Botswana/BW_Penal_Code.pdf (Date 
used 25/11/12).   
42
 Section 2 of the SA Constitution 1996.  
43
 Section 11 of the SA Constitution 1996.  
44
 Section 12(e) of the SA Constitution 1996.  
45
 Section 4(1) of Botswana Constitution. 
46
 Ibid n 28 supra. The agreement is not yet finalised due to lack of consensus (specifically 
amongst the Republics of South Africa, Botswana and Zambia) on some of the articles 
specifically on jurisdiction (hereinafter Draft SADC SOFA [Soft law]). (Department of Defence 
International Relation, minutes of the Meeting of the Attorney General from Republics of 
Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, dated 11 July 2012). 
47
 Id n 43 supra. 
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to non-citizens illegally in the country48, whereas in Botswana a person might 
face capital punishment.49 
Chapter 6 will be a micro-comparison of status of force agreements concluded 
by countries abroad, specifically focusing on NATO countries, the UK and the 
USA bilateral agreements concluded with the receiving states. The NATO 
agreement is chosen as it is widely accepted beyond the North Atlantic 
Alliance and it is just short of being a rule of customary law.50 The UK and the 
USA have been chosen as the two countries are having more of their armed 
forces stationed abroad.51 
Chapter 7 will be the argument in favour of limitation on state sovereignty and 
the emerging trend that state sovereignty is not absolute. I will further 
interrogate the argument in favour of and against exclusive jurisdiction using 
examples of some of the crimes committed by armed forces abroad. 
Chapter 8 will be the concluding chapter where shared jurisdiction and some 
guarantees will be the most probable solution where sovereignty of states will 
still be protected and the individual soldier’s legal status will be certain. 
1.5 Methodology 
The research involves a literature study of books, treaties, journal articles, 
legislation and case law. The study is primarily a study of the SADC 
agreement (focusing on relations between Botswana and South Africa). The 
approach will be from an international law perspective, looking into treaties, 
regional agreements, bilateral and multilateral agreements, analysis of foreign 
status of force agreement, analysis of legislation of both countries and lastly 
measuring the aforesaid against the constitutions of both countries. The 
recommendation will be made to both the representatives of South Africa and 
Botswana. 
                                                 
48
 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others, Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others v Tsebe and Others 2012 SA (16) (CC). 
49
 Bosch v The State (Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1999) 2001 BLR 71 (CA). Available at 
http://www.saflii.org/bw/cases/BWCA/2001/4.pdf (Date used 13/11/12). 
50
 Fleck The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (2001) at 7. 
51
 Id n 50 supra at 23. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORIGINS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
2.1 Historical overview of sovereignty 
One of the fundamental principles on which international law is founded is the 
principle of state sovereignty. The word sovereign originally derive from the 
French word souverain which literally means: A supreme ruler not 
accountable to anyone, except perhaps to God.52 The concept sovereign is 
equally captured in the Latin adage: Summa in cives ac subditos legibusque 
solute potest which literally translate into: Sovereign is the supreme power 
over citizen and subordinates and which supreme power is not subject to 
law.53 Originally the concept sovereignty referred to the absolute supremacy 
of the ruling monarch.54  
As times evolve the precise meaning of the term sovereignty became 
ambiguous and the following definitions (amongst others) have been offered: 
Sovereignty is the most extensive form of jurisdiction under international law. 
In general terms it denotes full and unchallengeable power over a piece of 
territory and all the persons from time to time therein.55 
                                                 
52
 Fowler Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept 
of Sovereignty (1996) n 20 at 4. See also Maogoto State Sovereignty and International 
Criminal Law: Versailles to Rome (2003) at 8. 
53
 Maogoto State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law: Versailles to Rome (2003) at 9. 
54
 Id n 52 supra at 11. 
55
 Bodley 1993 N.Y.U.J. Int’l LP at 419. MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, 
and Nation in the European Commonwealth (1999) at 127 provides the following explanation 
of the term “sovereignty” by distinguishing between legal and political sovereignty. “[W]hereas 
as a ‘merely a legal conception’, sovereignty is ‘the power of law-making unrestricted by any 
legal limit’, by contrast ‘that body is “politically” sovereign or supreme in a state the will of 
which is ultimately obeyed by the citizen of the state’. Power without restriction is on this view 
the key idea. Power of one kind, normative power or ‘authority’, is conferred by law. This may 
be a power of law-making in a certain territory conferred by a certain constitutional order that 
is effectively observed in that territory. Sovereign power is that which is enjoyed, legally, by 
the holder of a constitutional power to make law, so long as the constitution places no 
restriction on the exercise of that power… If the constitution then confers such power but 
contains no limit upon the power (other than the discretion and judgement of those who 
exercise the power) we may say that sovereignty is vested in the holder of the law-making 
power. But what of political sovereignty? By parallel reasoning, one will be inclined to define it 
as political power unrestrained by higher political power.... Political power is interpersonal 
power over the condition of life in human community or society. It is the ability to take effective 
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Nagan and Hammer while holding that the term sovereignty may have 
different meaning in jurisprudence, political science, history, philosophy and 
other related fields, however, in the final analysis the term includes the 
following; sovereignty as personalised monarch (real or ritualised), as 
absolute or unlimited control or power, as political legitimacy, as political 
authority, as legal immunities, as jurisdictional competence to make and/or 
apply law, and as basic governance competencies.56  
The term originally referred to the absolute supreme powers of the ruling 
monarch, but over time the term came to represent the independence of state. 
Internally states were not subjected to any powers. Externally they were free 
from any interference. The term is both a legal and a political expression. Only 
a sovereign state can be admitted into the international arena, in fact 
sovereignty is a prerequisite for admission. By virtue of being recognised as 
sovereign state, a state will qualify to be the holder of certain fundamental 
rights on the international arena, for example those relating to expropriation, 
to diplomatic and sovereign immunity and to jurisdiction over matters at home.  
Currently, the presence or absence of sovereignty determines the status of 
particular political entity.57  
Krasner58 offers the following four meanings of the term sovereignty: 
 Domestic sovereignty, which refers to the organisation of public authority 
within a state and the level of effective control exercise by those holding 
public authority. 
 Interdependence sovereignty, which is the ability of those holding public 
authority to control movement across the border.  
                                                                                                                                            
decision on whatever concern the common well-being of the members, and on whatever 
affects the distribution of the economic resources available to them.” MacCormick comes to 
conclusion that sovereign power is territorial in nature and is power not subjected to limitation 
by higher or coordinate power. See also Ferreira-Snyman The erosion of state sovereignty n 
3 at 2. 
56
 Nagan and Hammer 2004 Columbia Journal of Transitional Law at 143-145. 
57
 Id n 52 supra at 11-12. See also Fassbender “Sovereignty and constitutionalism in 
international law” in Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (2003) at 155. See further Ferreira-
Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 supra at 2-3 and n 7. 
58
 Krasner Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (1999) at 9.  
13 
 
 International legal sovereignty, which is the capacity of state to interact 
with other states. The state is treated at the international level similarly to 
the individual at the national level. 
 Westphalian sovereignty, which is understood as an institutional 
arrangement for organising political life and is based on two principles, 
namely territorial and the exclusion of external factors from domestic 
structures of authority. Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external 
factors influence or determine the domestic authority structures. This form 
of sovereignty can be compromised through intervention as well as 
through invitation, when a state freely subjects internal authority 
structures to external constraints.59 
According to Fassbender the term sovereignty embodies internal and external 
sovereignty. Internal sovereignty may be defined as the powers to exercise 
the function of a state within the national borders freely. External sovereignty 
refers to the legal independence of a state from all foreign powers, thus 
protecting the state territory against foreign interference.60 In Island of Palmas 
Case61 Max Huber defined external sovereignty as: 
Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence in regard 
to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the function of a State.62 
While the concept sovereignty is contentious and sometimes it is invoked 
selectively and self-servingly; in the end it is about a claim to ultimate 
authority made on behalf of society as a political society or as a polity.63 The 
term sovereignty encapsulates two concepts: political sovereignty which is the 
                                                 
59
 Id n 58 supra at 1–25. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 supra 
at 2. 
60
 Fassbender “Sovereignty and constitutionalism in international law” in Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transition (2003) at 117. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of State 
Sovereignty Id n 55 supra at 3–5. 
61
 Island of Palmas Case 2 RIAA 829 (1928). Available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_ii/829-871.pdf (Date used 23/03/13). 
62
 Id n 58 supra at 38. 
63
 Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (2003) at 17. 
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power that enact laws and legal sovereignty which is the law that restrains 
power.64 
2.2 The traditional meaning of sovereignty 
2.2.1 Jean Bodin (1530–1596) 
The term ‘sovereignty’ was introduced into political science in 1576 by Jean 
Bodin in his celebrated book, Les Six Livres De La Republique.65 He defined 
sovereignty as the absolute and perpetual power vested in commonwealth 
without any restriction except by the laws of God and nature. Bodin’s further 
exposition of the notion of sovereignty signified the absolute and sole original 
competence of law-making within the territorial boundaries of the state and 
that it will not tolerate any other law-creating agent over and above itself. No 
constitution could limit sovereignty and therefore a sovereign is above positive 
law. 66   
Thomas Hobbes defined the concept of sovereignty to mean absolute power. 
In his work, the Leviathan, he maintains that a sovereign was not bound by 
anything and had a right over everything, even over religion.67 Pufendorf is of 
a different view, he dismissed the idea that sovereignty embodies 
omnipotence. According to him sovereignty is the supreme power of a state, 
but not absolute power and sovereignty may well be constitutionally 
restricted.68 
2.2.2 Hugo Grotius 
Grotius’ writing about a half century after Bodin’s ground-breaking work and in 
the middle of the 30 Years War, adopted Bodin’s thinking that sovereignty 
                                                 
64
 Id n 52 supra at 19. Walker avers that the term is adaptable or evolving. He refers to these 
changes as late sovereignty. The fact that the concept is adaptable does not mean it must be 
discarded. See also n 52 supra at 11. 
65
 Bodin 1.8 at 23.  
66
 Id n 65 supra at 25. See also Maogoto State Sovereignty and International Law: Versailles 
to Rome (2003) at 8-10. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 supra 
at 15. 
67
 Hobbes 6.3. at 12–5. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 supra 
at 6. 
68
 Pufendorf 7.6.1 See also n 53 supra at 12. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state 
sovereignty Id n 55 supra at 6. 
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consisted of the exclusive power of legislation within the body politic.69 He 
distinguished between natural law which governs the relationship between 
state and law of nations which has received an obligatory force from the will of 
all nations or of man. His international legal system rested on the twin 
normative system of state sovereignty and pacta sunt servanda, meaning 
agreement is to be observed.70 According to Grotius the universal and binding 
(obligatory) natural law is the primary source of international law. He 
maintained that the laws governing relationship among states must first 
safeguard the sovereignty of states themselves holding that rules preventing 
interference in another state’s affairs will safeguard this sovereignty.71 
2.2.3 Westphalian sovereignty 
The concept of state sovereignty emanated from the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648,72 which ended the 30 Years War of religion between the Protestant and 
Catholic States in Europe. Westphalian sovereignty enshrined the internal and 
external autonomy of the state. It further enshrined political independence and 
territorial supremacy, thus forbidding an exercise of jurisdiction by any state 
over issues and individuals within another state’s territorial boundaries.73 The 
Peace of Westphalia finally buried the theory of unity of the civilised world 
under the Catholic Church. Many recognised independent states formed an 
international community on the basis of equality.74 The sovereign state, which 
emerged after the 30 Years of War, was unassailable both externally and 
internally. Externally it was free from the influence of other states.75 
2.3 The UN Charter on sovereignty 
The UN Charter acknowledges and affirms the concept of state sovereignty. 
Article 2(1) provides that the Charter is based on the principle of sovereign 
equality. Article 2(7) further provides that:  
                                                 
69
 Id n 53 supra at 20. 
70
 Grotius 1.1. at 162–3.  See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 
supra at 8. 
71
 Id n 70 supra at 259–260. See also Id n 53 supra at 18. 
72
 Peace of Westphalia was concluded in two different treaties, the Treaty of Münster and the 
Treaty of Osnabrück. 
73
 Id n 53 supra at 7. See also Krasner Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (1999) 1–25. 
74
 Id n 53 supra at 19. 
75
 Id n 53 supra at 20. 
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Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.76 
The Charter treats all member states as equals and thus discourages any 
member states or the United Nations from interfering in the internal affairs of 
another state. Matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the state 
should not be referred to the United Nations, but should rather be dealt with in 
terms of municipal laws. States have the limited freedom to deal with internal 
matters as they see fit, provided that their actions are not a threat to peace, 
breaches of peace or acts of aggression or put differently, their actions are not 
against international law.  
2.4 Declaration and Treaty of SADC    
The SADC Treaty follows the language of the UN Charter. Article 4(a) of the 
Declaration and Treaty of SADC acknowledges and obliges member states to 
act in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality. After the conclusion 
of the SADC Treaty; Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was 
concluded by SADC member states to give effect to the SADC Treaty 
specifically on matters of politics, defence and security. The SADC Protocol 
takes the concept of state sovereignty even further by providing in the 
preamble that:  
We, the Heads of State of Government of…  Recognising and reaffirming the 
principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, 
non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other states; …. 
                                                 
76
 Chapter VII deals with enforcement action to threat of peace, breaches of peace and acts 
of aggression. 
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The SADC Protocol is more precise with regard to the concept of sovereignty, 
it attempts in the preamble to define the concept in terms of its so called 
classical Westphalian meaning77 and its contemporary meaning.  
However, it seems as if strict respect for sovereignty and non-interference in 
the internal affairs of another state (classical Westphalian meaning) is strictly 
observed amongst the SADC states as manifested in the Campbell case78 
wherein the Republic of Zimbabwe (hereinafter Zimbabwe) stated 
categorically that it is not bound by decision of the SADC Tribunal.79 It relied 
on its sovereignty and asserted that its municipal laws take precedent over 
regional treaties (international law).80  
Subsequent to Zimbabwe denouncing the ruling of the SADC Tribunal, the 
SADC summit failed to renew the tenure of judges and resolved that a review 
of the powers of the Tribunal should be undertaken thus, effectively 
suspending the Tribunal. From the position taken by Zimbabwe and the 
subsequent actions of the SADC summit, it can be inferred that SADC 
members are not willing or are not yet ready to relinquish some of their 
sovereign rights to some supranational regional body, and in so doing 
entrenching the principle of strict respect to state sovereignty and non- 
interference in the internal affairs of another member state (Westphalian 
sovereignty).81 
From the aforesaid sketch of history of the conception of sovereignty as a 
fundamental and necessary characteristic of statehood, even though there 
                                                 
77
 “An institutional arrangement for organizing political life and is based on two principle 
namely territoriality and the exclusion of external factors from domestic structures.” Krasner 
Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (1999) at 1–25. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state 
sovereignty Id n 55 supra at 2. 
78
 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) 2008 SADCT 2 (28 
November 2008). In this case the applicant, Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd brought in an urgent 
application at the SADC Tribunal restraining the respondent (The government of Republic of 
Zimbabwe) from removing them from their agricultural lands, in terms of Zimbabwe municipal 
laws. The application was granted and earlier ruling of the Tribunal was confirmed. Available 
at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008/2.pdf (Date used 06/05/13). 
79
 The SADC Tribunal was established on 03
 
October 2002 in terms of SADC Treaty, to hear 
disputes between member state, and between natural person or legal person and member 
state. Available at http://www.sadc-
tribunal.org/docs/Protocol_on_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof.pdf (Date used 07/05/13). 
80
 Ndlovu 2011 SADCLJ  at 75. Available at 
http://www.saflii.org/na/journals/SADCLJ/2011/3.pdf (Date used 06/05/13).   
81
 Ibid n 78 supra. 
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was never unanimity regarding the exact bounds of this conception, 
traditionally one thing was clear – sovereignty intrinsically embodies the 
supreme authority of a state within its territorial sphere excluding dependence 
on any other authority, in particular another state. In essence, sovereignty is 
independence. It is internal independence with regard to freedom of action 
within the state borders. Sovereignty comprises the power of state to exercise 
supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory; it is in fact 
territorial supremacy. However, it has always been doubtful whether these 
powers were ever absolute. These powers, it seems, were always limited by 
the rights of other states (sovereign equality) and other higher norms (natural 
law).82 
2.5 Judicial jurisdiction (Criminal trials) 
2.5.1 Territorial principle 
The concept of state sovereignty intrinsically embodies the principle of 
territorial sovereignty,83 which denotes that a state has ‘exclusive competence 
with regard to its own territory’.84 In fact, for a state to exist and be recognised 
by the international community, it has to own a particular piece of territory on 
the globe.85 Therefore, territory plays an important part in international law, 
resulting in territory being regarded as a cornerstone in which jurisdiction in 
international law is based. A state while exercising its sovereign rights has a 
right to legislate and enforce its laws within its territory. Jurisdiction denotes 
the exercise of power by a state over events, person and property.86 States 
have jurisdiction over all persons, citizens, aliens and things within their 
                                                 
82
 Id n 58 supra at 14. See also Ferreira-Snyman Erosion of state sovereignty Id n 55 supra at 
9. 
83
 Territorial sovereignty covers all land, internal waters, territorial sea and its subsoil;, the 
airspace above the state, territory has been extended to 200 miles exclusive economic zone. 
Aust Handbook of International Law (2010) at 32. 
84
 Island of Palmas Case, award of 4 April 1928, United Nations reports of International 
Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol.II, p 838. Available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_ii/829-871.pdf (Date used 09/05/13. See also 
Williams and de Mestral An Introduction to International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and 
Applied in Canada (1987) at 108.  
85
 Aust Handbook of International Law (2010) at 3. 
86
 Id n 84 supra at 123. Bassiouni International Criminal Law (2013) offers the following 
definition:  “Jurisdiction may be defined as the authority to affect legal interest – to prescribe 
rules of law; to adjudicate legal questions; and to compel, induce compliance or take any 
other enforcement action…” at 88. 
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territory. This right to exercise jurisdiction is a manifestation of state 
sovereignty.87 Thus in the Greenland case the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ) held that, jurisdiction is a sovereign 
right.88 
For a state to exercise jurisdiction, it must be able to prove that the constituent 
element of the offence occurred in its territory. The PCIJ in the Lotus case89 
enunciated the following principles:  
(1) Jurisdiction is territorial; it may not be exercised outside state territory, except 
by virtue of permissive rule of international law either by custom or treaty. 
(2) International law does not prohibit a state from exercising jurisdiction in its 
own territory in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place abroad and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of 
international law.  
(3) The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not absolute; states have 
discretion to apply their laws outside its territory.90 
Article 3 of Harvard Research91 describes the territorial principle as follows: 
A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part 
within its territory. 92 
Thus in terms of the Harvard Research, territorial principle entails that a state 
should be able to claim jurisdiction only if the offence occurred wholly or in 
                                                 
87
 Id n 76 supra at 127. 
88
 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, PCIJ Series A-B (1933) 48. Available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf. (Date used 
07/05/13). See also Inazumi Universal Jurisdiction in modern international law: expansion of 
national jurisdiction for prosecuting serious crime (2005) at 17. 
89
 A collision on the high seas between the French steamer, Lotus and Turkish steamer, the 
Boz-kourt in 1926 resulted in the sinking of the Turkish vessel and the death of eight Turkish 
nationals. When the French vessel reached Constantinople (Instabule) the Turkish authorities 
instituted criminal proceedings against the French officer on watch-duty at the time of collision 
(Lieutenant Demons).  The Turkish court overruled Demons objection that Turkey had no 
jurisdiction and after a trial sentenced him to 80 days imprisonment and a fine of 22 pounds. 
The French government challenged Turkey’s action as violation of international law and 
demanded reparation. Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf  
(Date used 09/04/13). 
90
 Id n 84 supra at 18-19. See also Inazumi Universal Jurisdiction in modern international law: 
expansion of national jurisdiction for prosecuting serious crime (2005) at 23. See also Dugard 
A South African Perspective (2011) at 149-150. 
91
  Grant and Barker 1966 Harvard Research in International Law: Original Materials at 275. 
92
 Id n 91 supra at 439. See also Bassiouni International Criminal Law (2013) Id n 86 supra at 
97. 
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part (either commenced or completed) within its territory.93 Sometimes it 
happens that an offence is committed partly in one state and partly in another. 
The classical example is firing a gun over a frontier and in turn committing a 
crime. The question then arises as to which state has jurisdiction. Some 
writers argue in favour of conferring jurisdiction on the state in which the crime 
was initiated, some argue in favour of conferring jurisdiction on the state 
where the crime was completed.94 
2.5.1(a) Subjective territoriality principle 
This principle gives jurisdiction over crimes committed in the state where the 
offence commenced. If we used the aforementioned example of shooting over 
a frontier and assume that X, while in state A, shoots and injures Y who is 
standing in state B. Y is taken to hospital in state C where he later dies from 
his injuries. Then state A will have jurisdiction as the said offence commenced 
in state A.95 The same principle has been applied by the PCIJ in the Lotus 
case, wherein an act or omission done within the jurisdiction of one state (the 
crime was commenced within France’s ‘territory’) produced unintended effects 
(it was completed in Turkey’s ‘territory’) within the jurisdiction of another 
state.96 
2.5.1(b) Objective territoriality principle 
This principle denotes that the state where the offence was completed or 
where the effect or result of criminal conduct impacts on, that state has 
jurisdiction to try the offender. If we again use the aforementioned example of 
shooting over the frontier, then state B and C will have jurisdiction to try the 
offender as the offence was completed or the effect or the result of the 
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Ibid. See also Grant and Barker 2007 Harvard Research in International Law Contemporary 
Analysis and Appraisal Article at 487. See also Inazumi Universal Jurisdiction in modern 
international law: expansion of national jurisdiction for prosecuting serious crime (2005) n 90 
supra at 25. See also Id n 87 supra at 97. 
94
 Id n 86 supra at 484–487. See also Id n 76 supra at 128. See also Id n 89 supra at 101. 
See also Id n 2 supra at 32. See also Dugard A South African Perspective (2011) Id n 90 
supra at 152. 
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 Id n 86 supra at 487–494. See also Id n 77 supra at 128. See also Id n 89 supra at 101. 
See also Id n 2 at 32-33. See also Dugard A South African Perspective (2011) Id n 90 supra 
at 152. 
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 Id n 84 supra at 71. See also Id n 89 supra at 488. 
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criminal conduct was felt within their territory.97 Where all states claim 
jurisdiction, i.e. A, B and C, concurrent jurisdiction will be the most logical 
solution as there is no basis for preferring one state over the other.98  
Sometimes the territorial principle is taken further by using the devise of 
continuing offence like theft whereby a thief who steal goods in state A and 
brings them into state B could be prosecuted in either state.99 
Some states have claimed jurisdiction over offences committed abroad which 
merely produce effects on their territory, even if those effects were not a 
constituent element of the crime. This was the basis upon which Turkey 
exercised jurisdiction in the Lotus case. The effect of the collision was felt on 
the Turkish territory (ship).100 In terms of effect doctrine, jurisdiction can only 
be claimed by states where the primary effect is felt.101  
Two factors must be taken into consideration when determining whether the 
effects are primary or secondary:  
(1) Are the effects felt in one state more direct than the effects felt in 
another state? 
(2) Are the effects felt in one state more substantial than the effect felt in 
another state? This test limits the number of states which may 
exercise jurisdiction and prevents the exercise of jurisdiction by 
states with no legitimate interest.102   
Under the ‘effect factor’ directness is required to prevent jurisdiction being 
based on economic effects of a crime on the victim’s creditors, dependants, et 
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 Id n 89 supra at 100–101. See also Id n 2 supra at 32. 
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 Id n 2 supra at 32.  
99
 Id n 2 supra at 33. See also Dugard A South African Perspective (2011) Id n 90 supra at 
151. 
100
 Section 1(5) of the [English] Perjury Act, 1911, which provides that perjury by a person 
giving evidence before British in foreign countries for the purpose of judicial proceeding in 
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cetera.103 The requirement that the effect must be substantial, will prevent 
jurisdiction being exercised by every state which the effect was felt even if it 
was of a trivial nature. Thus in the Lotus case, Turkey was allowed to assume 
jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle over a crime of which 
negligence was an element.104 The primary effects approach provides a better 
means of keeping the jurisdiction of states within reasonable bounds than the 
constituent elements approach. 105 
2.5.2 Protective principle 
Under the protective principle a state may exercise jurisdiction over aliens 
who have committed acts abroad that are considered prejudicial to its safety 
and security.106 In terms of Article 7 and 8 of the Harvard Research the 
protective principle is meant to protect the security, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the state.107 The focus of the principle is the nature 
of the interest that may be injured; the place where the injury or the conduct 
took place is irrelevant. In most acts of terrorism and crimes against humanity, 
the state concerned will find jurisdiction based on protective principle.108 In 
order to limit its abuse, this principle is limited in the same way as the ‘effect 
doctrine’109 so that a state can claim jurisdiction only if the primary effect of 
the alien was to threaten that state. Furthermore, aliens tried in this way must 
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at least have some connection with the threatened state, for example 
residence.110  
2.5.3 Nationality principle 
Under nationality principle a state has jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
its national abroad. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator is 
generally accepted under international law. In terms of the Harvard Research 
a state has jurisdiction with respect to a crime committed by a natural person 
who was a national of that state when the crime was committed.111  
The application of the nationality principle differs from country to country. 
Countries within the common law tradition are reluctant to base jurisdiction on 
nationality hence it is only applied in certain circumscribed offences such as 
those threatening national security and trafficking in narcotics.112 However, 
civil-law countries prosecute and punish their own nationals for offences 
committed abroad. Most require that the offence be punishable in the place 
where it was committed as well.113  
Sometimes jurisdiction is based on some personal link between the accused 
and the state claiming jurisdiction. For example Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Liberia claim jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by their 
permanent residence.114 States often claim extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
members of their armed forces and civilian components in connection with 
crimes committed in the course of their duties.115 
2.5.4 Passive personality theory 
The theory provides a state with the competency to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators of criminal conduct that is aimed at or harms the nationals of the 
asserting state. Here the determining factor is the nationality of the victim.116 
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Historically Anglo-American countries were opposed to jurisdiction based on 
this theory, especially the United State. The Restatement (second) of the 
Foreign Relation Law of the United State provides in sub-section 30 that:   
 [A] state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching a legal 
consequence to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground 
that the conduct affects one of its nationals.117 
However, in recent times the passive-personality theory has been gaining 
recognition in international law and is now gradually being accepted by states 
which traditionally oppose it. It is accepted mainly as a means to try and curb 
the threat of international terrorism.118 
2.5.5 Universal jurisdiction 
When a national court exercises jurisdiction not based on any link with the 
crime committed, i.e. either on territorial principle, nationality principle or other 
accepted contacts with the offender it is exercising universal jurisdiction.119 It 
is exercising jurisdiction because these offences are condemned by virtually 
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all state domestic laws. The national court is acting on behalf of the 
international community as a whole, because the said crime is against all 
mankind.120  
Originally the crime of piracy was the only crime which was recognised as an 
international crime and thus nations had universal jurisdiction to try the 
crime.121 With regard to war crimes, there was uncertainty as to whether these 
crimes were subjected to the same jurisdictional rules as ordinary crimes. 
Some nations thought that they could only exercise jurisdiction if the crime 
was committed either within its territory or against its nationals or against its 
national interest, meaning there should be at least some connection between 
the crime and the nation concerned.122 On the other hand, allied nations tried 
war crimes committed on foreign territory by foreign nationals against the 
nationals of other allied nations and even against the nationals of enemy 
states.123 
Currently, the following crimes are recognised either under customary 
international law or through convention as international crimes: piracy, slave-
trading, crimes against humanity, war crimes, hijacking and sabotage of civil 
aircraft, genocide, apartheid and torture, thus conferring universal jurisdiction 
on states to try the offenders, notwithstanding the absence of any link.124 The 
reason why the state could exercise universal jurisdiction was because at the 
time, there was no permanent125 international criminal court where all those 
recognised international crimes could be referred to.126  
In 17 July 2002 the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the ICC) was 
established. In terms of the statute establishing the Court, the Court can only 
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try certain specified crimes committed within the territory or by nationals of 
states that are parties to the Statute.127 In essence the Rome Statute does not 
per se confer true universal jurisdiction on the Court as only signatory states 
can prosecute or extradite128 the person accused of the specified crime, and 
only if that person has a link with the state concerned, i.e. is a national or 
happen to be present in the territory of signatory state.129 
This matter will not be pursued any further as it falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  
2.6 Conclusion  
After the signing of the Peace of Westphalia new states were born. 
Concomitant with the emergence of these states, the concept of state 
sovereignty was born. The concept originally denoted that states were free 
from any external influence. After the Peace of Westphalia states had 
unlimited freedom to do as they wished within their territory (territorial 
integrity) to the exclusion of other states. However, as the globe became 
smaller the need for cooperation became necessary. The need for interaction 
between states challenged the Westphalian sovereignty, the freedom of other 
states encroached upon the Westphalian state. The very idea of unlimited 
freedom (absolute state sovereignty) was challenged and questions were 
raised as to whether these freedoms were ever absolute. 
With the need for cooperation becoming more pertinent and boundaries 
becoming smaller, nationals/citizens of one state found themselves on 
another state territory. Through cooperation (in the form of treaties) it came to 
be accepted that the rights of states are not absolute, they are limited by 
rights of others. The converse is also true: because rights had to be protected, 
treaties were concluded. By entering into agreement, the state limited their 
rights. The state could no longer rely on territory alone to confer jurisdiction. 
Other criterions have to be devised to confer jurisdiction. Currently, together 
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with territoriality, the protective, nationality and universal principles are 
accepted as criterions that could confer jurisdiction on states. And while 
exercising their sovereignty, states can extend or limit these rights through 
conventions. So the question of criminal jurisdiction for visiting forces during 
peace time will be answered by either applying the aforementioned principles 
or by consulting the relevant agreements between the states concerned. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY SOUTH AFRICA AND 
BOTSWANA IN SENDING THEIR ARMED FORCES ABROAD 
3.1 Background 
One of the sources of international law is treaty or convention.130 Article 
2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defined a treaty as: 
An international agreement concluded between states in a written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. 
Treaties are founded on one of the fundamental principle of international law, 
pacta sunt servanda.131 As sovereigns, states are free to enter into written 
agreement with one another to regulate their relationships. In so doing they 
can limit or extend their sovereign rights. Treaties may be bilateral thus 
creating relations between two states or multilateral and creating relations 
between many states.132 Furthermore, treaties may be regional133 or global134 
in nature.  
In terms of Chapter VIII Article 52(1) of the United Nations Charter 
(hereinafter the UN Charter),135 states are encouraged to establish regional 
arrangements (treaties) in order to deal with matters relating to international 
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(regional) peace and security. It is further required that these regional 
agreements should be consistent with the purpose and principle of the UN.136 
Member states that enter into these regional agreements are encouraged to 
settle regional dispute through these agencies before referring them to the UN 
Security Council.137 It further encourages development of peaceful settlement 
of regional dispute through these agencies either on the initiative of the states 
concerned or by referral from the Security Council.138 Article 52 of the UN 
Charter realises the importance of regional treaties (taking into account the 
time it might take the Security Council to intervene in regional dispute) as the 
parties to these treaties are suitably located to deal with any dispute that 
might arise in their region. By further requiring that the intention of these 
regional agencies should be to further the purpose and principles of the UN, it 
can be argued that action by the UN translates into action being taken by 
regional powers/member states for and/or on behalf of the UN.139  The UN 
does not have a permanent standby force; it depends on member 
states/regional powers to contribute personnel.140 Authority has to be granted 
by the Security Council before any action can be taken by member states in 
respect of any regional intervention. If authority cannot be obtained prior to 
the intervention, activities undertaken or contemplated should be reported to 
the Security Council immediately thereafter.141 
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The question of criminal jurisdiction arises every time the UN intends sending 
personnel to conflict areas:142 Who must exercise criminal jurisdiction if a 
member of the UN commits a crime while in the host country; is it the 
personnel contributing state or the receiving state? The most contentious 
point in respect of criminal jurisdiction is the prosecution of those serious 
offences for example murder, rape and culpable homicide that obviously falls 
outside the personnel scope of work. In trying to answer the question of 
criminal jurisdiction the UN has adopted and promulgated the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in order to address the 
question of jurisdiction in respect of the UN officials who find themselves in 
host countries,143 The Draft Model Status of Force Agreement between the 
United Nations and host countries mainly to address criminal jurisdiction of 
members of armed forces,144 and Memorandum of Understanding between 
the United Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to [the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operation] to regulate relations between the 
resource contributing state and the UN.145 
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3.2 UN and Regional Agreements 
3.2.1 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations146 
The question of immunity granted in terms of the provision of a treaty 
emanated from Article 7(4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations which 
gave the representative of the Member State and the League Officials the 
same privileges as diplomats.147 This in turn was followed by Article 104 and 
105 of the Charter of the United Nations which accords particular status, 
immunities and privileges to the UN and its officials whilst on official functions. 
This ultimately resulted in the creation and adoption of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (hereinafter the UN Privileges 
Convention).148 
In terms of Article V Section 18(a) of the UN Privileges Convention officials149 
of the UN shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or 
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Section 20 of 
Article V provides that these privileges and immunities are to be exercised in 
the interest of the UN and not for personal interest. Furthermore, the 
Secretary General is mandated to waive the immunities of any official, if in 
his/her opinion, the immunity will be detrimental to the proper administration of 
justice and the interest of the UN will not be prejudiced. In the Brzak case the 
United States Supreme Court held that the UN enjoys absolute immunity and 
the decision, whether to waive or not to waive the immunities of any official is 
for the Secretary General to make, and further that the decision cannot be 
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challenged in the US courts.150 However, in the same period there had been 
concerns based on the atrocities committed by UN officials and experts on UN 
missions.151 The General Assembly held a discussion on 8 October 2010 
whereby renewed efforts to prosecute criminal misconduct were explored.152 
The renewed efforts were prompted by ‘atrocities’ committed by the officials 
and experts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter DRC).153 The 
UN Privileges Convention protects all those people who are clearly identified, 
defined and their details are compiled and recorded by the Secretary General 
who at the time is in service of the UN.154 
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Section18(a) of Article V of the UN  Privileges Convention does provide 
immunity to UN personnel from laws of host country nationals, however, that 
protection is not absolute as section 20 confers powers on the Secretary 
General to waive those immunities if administration of justice so requires. 
Therefore, in certain circumscribed cases a UN official might be prosecuted 
by the host state under its own municipal laws provided that the prosecution is 
not prejudicial to the UN.155 UN officials are therefore protected only if their 
action or what they say is in the interest of the UN or, put differently, they are 
protected only when what they do or say is in the official execution of their UN 
duties and functions. Committing criminal offences, especially serious 
common law offences like murder, rape and culpable homicide, will not fall 
within the interest and principles of the UN, nor will they qualify as official 
execution of UN duties. Therefore, UN officials are not for all intents and 
purposes absolutely immune from criminal jurisdiction; they might still be 
prosecuted by the host country if they commit crimes outside their scope of 
work.156 The UN Privileges Convention only covers those officials identified 
and their details are recorded by the Secretary General. With regard to 
Peacekeeping Forces the UN and the host state will normally regulate their 
relationship with what is referred to as Status of Force Agreement (hereinafter 
SoFA).157 The relationship between the UN and participating state contributing 
resources to UN is regulated by memorandum of understanding between the 
UN and that contributing state.158 
                                                 
155
 However, where a host state’s legal system is dysfunctional, the Secretary-General is 
unlikely to waive a peacekeeper’s immunity from criminal prosecution and this will result in 
impunity. The question of accountability of United Nation staff and expert on mission was 
raised in: The UN Secretary-General 2006 UN Doc. A/60/980. Available at 
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-60-980.pdf. (Date used 28/07/13). See also Defels 2008 
WUGSLR at 195. Available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf. 
(Date used 28/07/13). 
156
 Ladley 2005 Edinburg University Press at 85. The issue of immunity arose during the UN 
mission in East Timor when a Finnish civilian staff member killed a 72-year old Timorese 
woman in a hit-and-run car accident. The initial refusal of the United Nations to waive 
immunity was met with dismay by local Timorese and the man’s immunity was eventually 
lifted, although he was subsequently released and allowed to return to Finland. Available at 
http://www.isil.ir/PDFSS/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYA NDIMPUNITY.pdf. (Date used 
15/06/13). 
157
 Ibid n 144 supra. 
158
 Oswald, Durham and Bates Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operation (2010) at 35. 
34 
 
3.2.2 Draft Model Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations 
and host country159 (hereinafter Model SoFA) 
Before sending peace-keeping force(s) to conflict areas the UN will negotiate 
a formal agreement with the host country which will define the legal status of 
both the peace operation and the individual peacekeepers. The status-of-
force agreements are the crucial documents that grant facilities, outline rights, 
including the privileges and immunities, required by peacekeepers to perform 
their duties.160 The Model SoFA is premised on the provision of the UN 
Privileges Convention and the 1956 UN SoFA.161 The Model SoFA is intended 
to serve as a basis for the drafting of an individual agreement between the UN 
and the host countries. The parties are allowed to modify the Model SoFA to 
suit their individual and specific needs; however, the Model SoFA remains the 
starting point. In the absence of any agreement, or during the negotiation of a 
specific SoFA, the Model SoFA remains the applicable document.162  
The question of criminal jurisdiction is regulated by Chapter VI of the Model 
SoFA. Paragraph 46 of the Model SoFA provides that: 
All members of the United Nations peace-keeping operation including locally 
recruited personnel shall be immune from legal process in respect of words 
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity…  
The above paragraph accords with immunity given to officials in terms of 
section 18(a) of the Convention discussed above. Therefore, members of the 
UN peace-keeping operation are only protected (immune) if what they do is in 
the official execution of their duties. The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (hereinafter SRSG) is the one to determine whether 
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actions falls within the definition of official duties or not. The determination of 
SRSG is crucial because once he/she waives immunity the person alleged to 
have committed the offence will be prosecuted by the local courts.163 The UN 
has made it clear that it does not accept responsibility for acts carried out in 
‘unofficial capacity’.164 
Criminal offences are covered by paragraph 47 of the Model SoFA.  This 
paragraph distinguishes between crimes committed by the civilian component 
and the military component of the peacekeeping force. If a civilian member of 
the force is alleged to have committed a crime, the SRSG shall conduct an 
inquiry and if satisfied he/she shall agree with the host government whether or 
not criminal proceedings should be instituted against that civilian member. If 
there is no agreement between the SRSG and the host government the 
matter is dealt in terms of paragraph 53 of the Model SoFA.165 The general 
position is that civilian members are subjected to criminal jurisdiction of the 
host countries for offences committed, however the SRSG may refuse to give 
permission if concern is raised in respect of the human rights standard of host 
country or proper functioning of their justice system. If the SRSG refuses to 
give permission, the person might go unpunished as the UN does not have 
prosecutorial powers.166 
In terms of paragraph 47(b) of the Model SoFA military members of the 
military component of the peacekeeping operation are subjected to the 
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exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their respective contributing state in respect 
of any crime committed on the host country’s territory. This paragraph does 
not distinguish between ‘official capacity’ and ‘unofficial capacity’,167 therefore 
the contributing state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction in respect of any 
criminal act committed by military member, the reason being that members of 
the armed forces are subject to their own military system while serving on 
peace operations.168 In addition to exercising exclusive criminal jurisdiction, 
the contributing state is required to give assurance to the Secretary-General 
of the UN that they will indeed exercise criminal jurisdiction if any of their 
nationals commit an offense during a peace operation.169 In most of the 
agreements concluded between UN and host countries, the Model SoFA 
served as the basis and in some cases the Model SoFA was copied 
verbatim.170 
3.2.3 Agreement between the United Nations and the African Union and the 
Government of Sudan concerning the status of African Union/United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (hereinafter UNAMID). 
South Africa contributed troops to the mission in Darfur.171 The UNAMID172 
follows the language of the Model SoFA discussed above. Paragraph 50 of 
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UNAMID provides that all members, including locally recruited personnel, are 
immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written or acts 
perform by them in their official capacity. It further distinguishes between 
civilian and military members of the military component. If the crime is alleged 
to have been committed by a civilian member, the Joint Special 
Representative will conduct an enquiry and if satisfied that indeed an offence 
has been committed, he/she will allow the government of Sudan to institute 
criminal proceeding(s). If there is no agreement between the government and 
the Joint Special Representative the matters might be send for arbitration in 
terms of paragraph 57. If the parties agree that the government of Sudan 
should prosecute it should do so in accordance with international norms and 
standard of justice. Civilian members of the military component of UNAMID 
are therefore subjected to laws and courts of Sudan.173 This is in line with the 
Model SoFA discussed above. 
Military members of the military component of UNAMID are subject to 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their respective contributing state in respect 
of any alleged criminal offence committed by them while in Sudan. Again 
there is no distinction between acts committed in official capacity and acts 
committed in unofficial capacity, the contributing state enjoys exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction.174 The reason being that military members are always 
subjected to their own military justice system during peace operations 
irrespective of the place they are.175 They cannot be prosecuted by the 
Sudanese government under Sudanese laws. This again is in accordance 
with paragraph 47(b) of the Model SoFA discussed above. 
3.2.4 Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Republic 
of South Africa and African Union Contributing Resources to the African Union 
Mission in Burundi (hereinafter AMIB). 
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Article 7 of AMIB176 provides that: 
South Africa shall have exclusive criminal jurisdiction in respect of offences 
committed by its members. However, South Africa shall prosecute, in 
conformity with its national laws, any of its members who has committed an 
offence in the territory of Burundi and which has led to repatriation. South 
Africa shall inform the AU of the outcome of legal actions taken against such 
member through the official channels. 
The above Article does not distinguish between the civilian component and 
the military component of the peacekeeping force. South Africa enjoys 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction in respect of all its members, therefore all 
members (civilian and military) are immune from the laws of the host country 
(Burundi). This is in contrast with the Model SoFA discussed above wherein 
civilians are not absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of the host country. 
Further, South Africa undertakes to prosecute any of its members who commit 
a crime in accordance with its own national laws. These accords with 
paragraph 48 of Model SoFA which requires the Secretary General to obtain 
assurance from the contributing state that it will indeed exercise jurisdiction if 
any of its members commit a crime while in the host nation.  
In the incident of Venter,177 a South African soldier on peacekeeping mission 
in Burundi was charged with rape and murder of a Burundian girl,178 South 
Africa retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The accused was tried by a 
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South African military court under South African military law.179 Due to the 
nature of the offence and the resultant tension it created, especially among 
the Burundians, the sitting of the court was partly in South Africa and partly in 
Burundi. However, in all the sittings the presiding officers were all South 
Africans and the law which was applied was South African.180 
Jurisdiction in the Venter case was decided in accordance with the agreement 
establishing AMIB with necessary adaptation. The case shows the difficulty 
which a state may face with regard to criminal jurisdiction, especially in 
respect of serious offences. Such difficulties include the securing of 
witnesses, distance between the place where the crime took place and the 
place where the trial must take place, language barriers, etc.181 Further the 
relation between the countries can be permanently damaged. 182 
3.2.5 Legal status of the Botswana Defence Force during United Nation 
Operation in Mozambique (hereinafter ONUMOZ)  
The UN operation was established pursuant to a Security Council Resolution 
797 (1992) approving the deployment of political, military, electoral and 
humanitarian elements in Mozambique to monitor ceasefire agreement.183 
Subsequent to the resolution, an agreement between the United Nations and 
the Government of Mozambique on the Status of the United Nations 
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Operation in Mozambique (hereinafter ONUMOZ) was signed outlining the 
terms and conditions of the operation.184 
Botswana was part of ONUMOZ and contributed troops to the mission.185 In 
terms of Article 5 of ONUMOZ members of the peace-keeping force are 
immune from any legal processes in respect of words spoken or written and 
all acts performed by them in their official capacity. It further differentiates 
between civilian and military components of the mission. If a crime is 
suspected to have been committed by a member of the mission, the SRSG 
should be informed and be presented with the necessary evidence. If the 
member is a civilian, the SRSG will decide if immunity has to be waived or 
not.186 
The military component of ONUMOZ is subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of their participating state. There is no distinction between official and non-
official capacity, meaning that military members cannot be tried by the host 
state. Therefore, Botswana armed forces could only be tried in Botswana and 
under Botswana (military) law.187 This is in accordance with paragraph 47(b) 
of the Model SoFA discussed above.  
Botswana has participated in a limited number of UN peacekeeping missions 
ONUMOZ being one of them. In 1992 and 1993, a BDF contingent 
participated in UNOSOM II.188 The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take 
appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian assistance189 throughout Somalia All troop 
contributing states during UNOSOM II retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
over their armed forces, therefore BDF armed force were subjected to 
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Botswana (military) law.190 BDF also participated in ‘Operation BOLEAS’191, a 
SADC military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. The two operations discussed 
above were more of an intervention and Botswana retained exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over her forces.192 
3.2.6 SADC Treaty, SADC Protocol, SADC MoU, SADC Defence Pact193 and 
Draft SADC SoFA 
In furtherance of Chapter III, Article 52 of the UN Charter (discussed above) 
Southern African countries adopted the Declaration and Treaty of SADC 
wherein relationships amongst member states were established.194 One of the 
objectives of the SADC Treaty is to promote and defend peace and security in 
the SADC region.195 In fulfilment of its mandate it will be required of SADC 
member states to send personnel or staff to another member state territory.196 
The question of criminal jurisdiction will arise every time member states send 
personnel to another state’s territory. 
In order to address the aforementioned issue article 31(1) of the SADC Treaty 
provides: 
SADC, its institution and staff shall, in the territory of each Member State, 
have such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the proper 
performance of their functions under this Treaty and which shall be similar to 
those accorded to comparable international organizations. 
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The aforementioned paragraph accords with Article 104 and 105 of the UN 
Charter and the UN Privileges Convention discussed above. It means that 
SADC personnel/staff are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the host 
member state. Because of the requirement that such immunities should be 
similar to those accorded to comparable international organisations, SADC 
personnel will most probably be immune from legal processes for words 
spoken or written, and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. 
However, the actions or words should be in the interest of SADC and not for 
personal gain; otherwise the immunities will most likely be waived. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the SADC Treaty provides that immunities and 
privileges conferred by this Article shall be prescribed in a Protocol. The 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African 
Development Community Region (SADC Protocol) was signed to give effect 
to the SADC Treaty on matters of politics, defence and security.197 However, 
the SADC Protocol does not address the question of immunities and 
privileges. It rather refers extensively to the UN Charter, the Organisation of 
African Unity and international law.198 The SADC Protocol will therefore be 
interpreted in accordance with international law.199 
The SADC MoU and the SADC Defence Pact are silent on the question of 
criminal jurisdiction. In terms of the Draft SADC SoFA, it appears that the 
SADC member states are unanimous that a sending state should exercise 
criminal jurisdiction where a national of a sending state commits a crime in the 
course and scope of his or her work, while in the host country.200 The 
contentious point involves a situation where a member commits crime outside 
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his or her scope of work. Currently there is no agreement in respect of the 
latter.  
In the absence of any agreement in respect of criminal jurisdiction the legal 
status of the visiting soldier remains uncertain. In almost all the SADC 
agreements discussed above reference is extensively made to international 
instruments and international law. It can therefore be inferred that the 
agreements will most likely be interpreted in accordance with international 
law.201 This means that the individual concerned might be accorded the 
immunities and privileges conferred under international law. 
3.3 Bilateral agreements 
3.3.1 Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 
concerning the Secondment of the Air Force of  Zimbabwe Personnel to the 
South African Department of Defence (hereinafter the South Africa-Zimbabwe 
Air Force MoU) 
In terms of Article 5 of the South Africa-Zimbabwe Air Force MoU, members 
of the Zimbabwean Air Force remain members of their air force while in South 
Africa. They are accorded the status, immunities and privileges equivalent to 
those provided to members of the administrative and technical staff of the 
High Commission of the sending State in the Host State under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.202 
If we read the South Africa-Zimbabwe Air Force MoU together with the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, we may conclude that Zimbabwe Air 
Force personnel are immune from South African municipal law in respect of 
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crimes committed, meaning that they will be tried by a Zimbabwean court and 
under Zimbabwean law, thus Zimbabwe retains exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction.203 
3.4 Conclusion  
In all the UN peacekeeping operations two principles are clear: Firstly, civilian 
component and expert on mission are protected under the UN Privileges 
Convention. They enjoy limited immunity. They are only protected from the 
host nation’s criminal jurisdiction if what they say or do is in the official 
execution of their duties. If what they say or do is not in the interest of the UN 
the Secretary General or SRSG will have the power to waive the immunity. If 
the Secretary General decides to waive the immunity the alleged perpetrator 
will be tried by the host nation under its own domestic laws. When deciding on 
the question of whether to waive immunity or not, the Secretary General or 
SRSG will take into consideration the human rights history and the 
effectiveness of the justice system of the host nation. As most host nations 
have weak justice systems and a bad record of human rights,204 the Secretary 
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General or SRSG will most likely refuse to waive immunities resulting in the 
perpetrator going unpunished. 
Secondly, the armed members of a peacekeeping force are protected under a 
SoFA agreement. They are subjected to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of 
their sending state. No attempt is made to distinguish between “official” and 
“non-official” duties. They are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the host 
nation for all (allegedly committed) offences. Further, the troop-contributing 
states have to assure the Secretary General or SRSG that they will indeed 
exercise criminal jurisdiction if their members commit offences. 
In all the agreements concluded between the UN, South Africa and Botswana 
respectively, South Africa and Botswana retained exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over all their respective armed forces. Civilian components and 
experts on mission were covered under the UN Privileges Convention, thus 
South Africa and Botswana had limited criminal jurisdiction. The only 
agreement which was sui generis was AMIB in that it did not distinguish 
between the civilian component and armed forces. All South African members 
in this mission were subjected to exclusive jurisdiction of South Africa. 
In most bilateral agreements entered into by South Africa and other African 
countries, all members (civilian and armed forces) were subjected to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state. Botswana seems to be reluctant to 
send its troops abroad recently, (especially in unstable conflict areas) and it 
only participated in fewer missions and has signed fewer bilateral agreements 
with other African countries.205 
The approaches enunciated above will most probably lay the foundation for 
future agreements which both South Africa and Botswana might conclude with 
other states in sending their armed forces abroad during peace time. The 
sending states (South Africa and Botswana) will most likely retain exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction over its armed forces for all crimes committed while 
                                                                                                                                            
06/08/13). See also Amnesty International Report 2012 on Sudan. Available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/sudan/report-2012. (Date used 21/10/13). 
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 Tebele “Botswana plans peacekeeping support in DRC.” Available at 
http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=8110&title=Botswana%20plans%20
peacekeeping%20support%20in%20DRC&type=83. (Date used 06/08/13). 
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stationed in the host country.206 Together with the right to exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction, it might further be required that the sending state gives assurance 
to the host nation that it will indeed prosecute its nationals for any offence 
committed while in the host nation.207   
The civilian component of the mission might be subjected to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the host nation if the alleged conduct is not adjudged to be 
within the official execution of duties.208 In some cases the civilian component 
of the delegation might be subjected to exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the 
sending state for all criminal offences.209 A clause might be inserted into the 
agreement requiring the sending state to waive its right to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction (in circumscribed cases) over its nationals in favour of the host 
nation.210 
Before concluding any agreement with any state Botswana and South Africa 
have to take their domestic laws into cognisance. The main legislations for 
BDF are Botswana Defence Act and Botswana Penal Law, for South Africa is 
Defence Act 42 of 2002, Defence Act 44 of 1957 (as amended) and the 
Military Disciplinary Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999. The 
aforementioned pieces of legislation prescribe and proscribe what the two 
countries can or cannot do with regard to their armed forces. 
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 Article 47(b) of the Model SOFA. See also article 7 of AMIB. See further Ibid n 174, Ibid n 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGISLATION RELEVANT TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA BOTSWANA ARMED FORCES 
4.1 Introduction 
The SANDF is established in terms of section 199(1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.211 The SANDF is the only lawful military force 
in the Republic212 and it is structured and regulated by national legislation.213 
The primary role of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic, its 
territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the 
principle of international law.214  
Together with the protection of the Republic the SANDF may further be 
employed to fulfil an international obligation.215 While fulfilling an international 
obligation, members of the SANDF are required to observe customary 
international law and international agreements binding on South Africa.216 The 
relevant statutes giving effect to these constitutional imperatives are the 
Defence Act 44 of 1957 (as amended), the Defence Act 42 of 2002 and the 
Military Disciplinary Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999.  
Botswana Defence Force (hereinafter BDF) is established in terms of section 
4(1) of Botswana Defence Act 13, 1977 (hereinafter Botswana Defence Act). 
The Botswana Defence Act provides that the BDF may be employed outside 
or beyond Botswana.217 It further provides that members of the BDF may 
undergo training outside Botswana.218 
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 Hereinafter SA Constitution 1996. 
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 Section 199(2) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
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4.2 South African Legislation 
4.2.1 Defence Act 42 of 2002 
The Defence Act 42 of 2002 (hereinafter the SA Defence Act) was enacted to 
give effect to the SA Constitution 1996.219 The Act applies to all members of 
the SANDF whether posted or employed inside or outside South Africa.220  
Section 93 of the SA Defence Act gives the SANDF the legal mandate to 
render service in fulfilment of an international obligation. This international 
obligation results in members of SANDF being employed outside South 
Africa. This, in turn, is in line with section 200(2)(c) of the SA Constitution 
1996 discussed above. In practical terms this results in SANDF members 
forming part of SADC, the African Union or UN peacekeeping or enforcement 
forces.221 While being in service of such an international obligation (outside 
South Africa) members of SANDF are subjected to SA Defence Act.222 
Section 94(1)(a) of the SA Defence Act further provides that the Minister [of 
Defence] may temporary attach to the SANDF any member of a force of 
another country or international body who is placed at the disposal of the 
Minister. It further provides that the Minister may equally place a member of 
the SANDF at the disposal of the military authorities of another country.223 
This means that members of foreign forces may be attached to the SANDF 
and members of the SANDF may too be attached to other foreign forces not 
in fulfilment of an international obligation but as part of bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation.224  
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  Ibid n 185 supra. 
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 Section 3(a) of SA Defence Act. 
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 Ibid n 159 and 163 supra.  
222
 Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the SA Defence Act provides…this Act applies to all members of 
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Force, two to the Zambia Defence Force, two to the Zimbabwe Defence Force, eight to BDF 
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Cooperate Service SA Army Level 2 (Foreign Relation), dated 16/08/13. An international 
obligation will be performed under or with the authorisation of the UN or will be reported 
immediately thereafter to the UN. During the fulfillment of this international obligation the 
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When members of the armed forces are placed at each other’s disposal they 
are subjected to the law applying to those defence forces i.e. they are 
subjected to the military laws225 of the host nation.226 The question arises 
what exactly ‘subjected to military laws’ of the host nation means. Does this 
only apply to questions of discipline and administration or does it apply to all 
situations i.e. if a member commits a serious offence, will he/she be subjected 
to the host national (military) laws meaning that he/she will be tried by the 
host (military) courts applying their own domestic (military) laws?  
The Act further stipulates that any agreement either in fulfilment of an 
international obligation or as part of cooperation with other countries must 
provide for the legal status of members of the SANDF and if a visiting force is 
attached to the SANDF its legal status must too, be provided.227 This implies 
that before the SANDF can be placed at the disposal of an international 
organisation, an agreement between the government of South Africa and that 
international organisation must be signed outlining the legal status of the 
SANDF while on such service.228 Furthermore, before the SANDF can visit 
another state or before a foreign force can visit South Africa an agreement 
                                                                                                                                            
SANDF will form part of either the UN or the African Union or the SADC force. These 
international obligations manifest themselves in the form of peacekeeping/enforcement 
operations (see chapter 3 paras 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, and 3.2.6 supra for a discussion) and will 
mostly fall under Article 52(1), 53 and 54 of UN Charter (see para 3.1 supra for a discussion). 
Bilateral cooperation on the other hand may be undertaken for reason other than 
peacekeeping, for example, South Africa-Zimbabwe MoU (para 3.3.1 supra) was for the 
purpose of training South African Air Force pilots. SANDF BDF Health (para 4.2.1(a) was 
concluded for the purpose of cooperation in health matters. Bilateral/cooperation is mostly for 
purpose of training or capacity building (see id n 16 supra). Bilateral/multilateral cooperation 
will not necessarily be regulated by the aforesaid articles. 
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 In terms of s 3(a) SA Defence Act the Act (Military law) applies to all members of Defence 
Force, auxiliary service and employees. The Act defines ‘member’ to mean any officer and 
other rank. The MDSMA applies to Permanent Force, Reserve Force, auxiliary services and 
any person attached to SANDF. In Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another the 
Constitutional Court held that military justice system/law/courts is concerned with the 
maintenance of discipline as required by s 200(1) of the SA Constitution 1996 that the 
Defence Force must be structured and managed as a discipline force and not with punishing 
crime or maintaining and promoting law, order and tranquility in society. Base on the afore-
said military law can be defined as laws applicable to members of the armed forces and 
persons attached thereto in order to maintain discipline. 
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 Section 94(2)(a) of the SA Defence Act provides …a member of a force of any other 
country or international body who is attached temporarily to the Defence Force is subjected to 
the law applying to that portion of the Defence to which he or she is attached and must be 
treated, and has the same power of command and punishment over members of the Defence 
Force, as if he or she were a member of that force of rank equivalent to the held by him or her 
as a member of the force of the country or international body from which he or she came.  
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 Section 92(a) and (b) of the SA Defence Act. 
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  Ibid n 158 supra. 
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must be signed outlining the legal status of the SANDF or that visiting force 
while in either state’s territory. This means that the SANDF cannot fulfil an 
international obligation, or cooperate with another country, or that a visiting 
force cannot be attached to the SANDF before the signing of an agreement 
detailing the legal status of such an obligation or cooperation between the 
SANDF and that visiting force. The Act uses the word ‘must’ meaning it is 
mandatory for an agreement to be signed before such an obligation or 
cooperation. It seems the requirement that any agreement should provide for 
the legal status of members suggests that ‘subjected to military laws’ 
(discussed in the preceding paragraph) does not per se confer exclusive legal 
jurisdiction on the host state over the visiting force, thus the legal status may 
be varied by an agreement. 
In all the international obligations, i.e. UN/AU peacekeeping missions, in 
which the SANDF took part, the deployments were preceded by the signing of 
memorandums of understanding with the UN and/or African Union or the host 
nation which outlined the terms and conditions of such missions.229 The 
question of criminal jurisdiction was answered as required by section 92(a) 
and (b) of the SA Defence Act (this matter was covered in chapter three supra 
and will not be pursued any further). 
Where members of armed forces are placed at each other’s disposal in terms 
of section 94 of the SA Defence Act, an agreement must be signed outlining 
the terms and conditions of the cooperation. South Africa has signed quite a 
number of bilateral agreements with other states in fulfilment of section 92 of 
the SA Defence Act allowing members of SANDF to be attached to foreign 
armed forces and concomitantly allowing members of foreign armed forces to 
be attached to the SANDF.230 The few chosen bilateral agreements concluded 
by Botswana, South Africa and other states will be analysed with emphasis on 
the question of criminal jurisdiction in particular. 
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 For a discussion of these Memorandums of Understanding see chapter 3, para 3.2.3, 3.2.4 
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4.2.1(a) Technical arrangements between the South African National 
Defence Force and the Botswana Defence Force concerning Military Health 
Service Cooperation231 (hereinafter SANDF/BDF Health Cooperation) 
The question of criminal jurisdiction is not directly addressed by the 
SANDF/BDF Health Cooperation. In terms of Article 2 of the SANDF/BDF 
Health Cooperation the parties to the agreement are not obliged to take any 
action in terms of this agreement if such action will be contrary to their 
domestic law or their constitution. Further, the parties waive all claims against 
each other for injury or death suffered by patients while in either party’s 
hospital.232 Article 9 further provides that any disputes arising from the 
interpretation or the implementation of the agreement shall be resolved 
amicably through consultation or negotiation. 
In terms of this agreement, the laws of both parties will be respected and no 
party will try to impose its laws on another party or its members, so by 
implication members of either party will be subjected to their own domestic 
laws while in the host country. By further waiving all claims it can be inferred 
that in case of a criminal offence being committed, the right to exercise 
jurisdiction will most probably be waived by the host state to the sending 
state. This is in line with the principle of international law where sovereign 
states are free to limit or extend their rights through convention.233 If the 
dispute cannot be resolved legally, political intervention will most probably be 
the route to take, in fact the latter might even precede the former.234 
4.2.1(b) Protocol between the government of the Republic of South 
Africa and the government of the Republic of Angola on Defence Cooperation 
(hereinafter South Africa/Angola Protocol)235 
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 SANDF/BDF Health cooperation was signed on 02/03/11 in South Africa mainly to 
facilitate referral of patience and persons accompanying them from either country, between 
military hospitals of both countries. Information supplied by Chief Cooperate Service SA Army 
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The South Africa/Angola Protocol is not clear with regard to jurisdiction. Article 
7 which is titled “Jurisdiction” holds that: 
The visiting Party shall respect the domestic law, custom and traditions of the 
host Party and shall comply with the disciplinary laws and instructions of the 
military institutions of the host Party. 
The above coincide with section 94 of the SA Defence Act (discussed above) 
wherein attached members of the foreign armed forces are subjected to the 
laws of the host country while attached thereto. However, the question of 
jurisdiction is not clear or fully addressed wherein a member attached fails to 
comply with the afore-mentioned provision. To put it differently: Who will  
exercise jurisdiction if the member breaks the domestic laws or fails to comply 
with disciplinary laws and instructions of the military institution and as a result 
commits a serious criminal offence?  
Article 8 of the South Africa/Angola Protocol provides that disputes which may 
arise between the two countries during implementation and/or interpretation 
shall be resolved amicably through consultation and negotiation. So if a 
matter of criminal jurisdiction arises it will most probably be resolved politically 
through consultation and negotiations as Article 7 discussed above and does 
not per se solve the question of jurisdiction. 
In the above bilateral agreements the question of criminal jurisdiction is not 
clear. However, the opinion of the South African government is that South 
Africa should retain exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces stationed.236 
Botswana’s attitude is that Botswana too should retain exclusive jurisdiction 
over its armed forces stationed abroad.237 
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4.2.1(c) Visiting forces 
Section 97 of the SA Defence Act deals with discipline and internal 
administration of the visiting forces while in the country. Section 97(1)(a) of 
the SA Defence Act provides that: 
subject to paragraph (b), a military court or other authority of a visiting force 
may in matters concerning discipline and internal administration of that force, 
which may include the administration of property or the estate of the of the 
deceased member of that force, within the Republic exercise all such powers 
as are conferred upon such court or authority by the law of that country.  
The above section confers some form of jurisdiction on the military court or 
authority of a visiting force. However, the powers are limited to matters of 
discipline and the internal administration of that force only. This is the first 
limitation contained in the section. If a matter is adjudged not to be a 
disciplinary matter or is not for internal administration of that force, the military 
court or authority will not exercise jurisdiction as this will fall outside their legal 
mandate. Exactly what is meant by disciplinary and administrative matters is 
debatable. Committing a serious military offence like mutiny will most 
definitely fall under this category. However, it is questionable that serious 
civilian criminal offences like rape, murder or culpable homicide will fall within 
this mentioned category. Therefore, a visiting military court or authority might 
not have jurisdiction to try serious civilian offences committed by their 
members while inside the Republic. 
Section 97(1)(b) provides: 
No cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment contemplated in section 12(1)(e) 
of the Constitution may be meted out or administered by a military court or 
other authority in terms of paragraph (a) while in the Republic. 
This is the second limitation placed upon the military court or other authority of 
the visiting force. So, while adjudicating on matters of discipline and 
administration (for example mutiny) a visiting military court may not hand out 
punishment which is cruel, inhuman or degrading. This section is in fact a 
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restatement of section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution and it will most probably be 
interpreted and applied as such.238 
The right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment firstly 
came before the court in the leading case of Makwanyane239 which was heard 
under the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (hereinafter Interim 
Constitution 1993). The facts were briefly as follows: The two accused in this 
matter were convicted in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the Supreme 
Court on four counts of murder, one count of attempted murder and one count 
of robbery with aggravating circumstances. They were sentenced to death on 
each of the counts of murder and to long terms of imprisonment on the other 
counts.   
The decision was confirmed on appeal by the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court. The courts postponed the hearing of appeals against the 
death sentence until the constitutional issues were decided by the 
Constitutional Court. Two issues were raised: The constitutionality of section 
277(1)(a)240 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the implications of section 
241(8)241 of the Interim Constitution 1993.242 
Thus, the question before the Constitutional Court was whether the death 
penalty was consistent with the provisions of the Interim Constitution 1993243 
specifically section 11(2) which prohibit cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment.244 In answering the question the Constitutional 
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243
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244
 Id n 239 supra at para 8. 
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Court referred extensively to the founding values of the Constitution245 and 
held that the right to dignity is central to the Constitution.  
The Constitutional Court further held that the right to dignity is one of the 
relevant factors that must be considered in determining whether punishment 
is cruel, inhuman or degrading.246 The right to dignity is at the centre of the 
right not to be tortured or to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way. The court held that section 277(1)(a) was inconsistent with 
section 11(2) of the interim Constitution 1993 (currently section 12(1)(e) of the 
Constitution, 1996). Thus, capital punishment violated the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment.247 
4.2.2 Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999248 
In terms of section 3 of Military Disciplinary Measures Act 16 of 1999 
(hereinafter MDSMA) the Act shall apply to any person subjected to the 
Code249 (hereinafter MDC) irrespective of whether such person is within or 
outside the Republic. This section is in conformity with section 3(a) of the SA 
Defence Act. This means the section read together with the MDC will confer 
jurisdiction on the military court to try any member of SANDF who commits an 
MDC or SA Defence Act or a common law offence while outside the country. 
Section 5 of MDSA provides: 
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56 
 
Whenever this Act [MDSMA] is enforced outside the Republic, any finding, 
sentence, penalty, fine or order made, pronounced or imposed in terms of its 
provision shall be as valid and effectual, and shall be carried into effect, as if it 
had been made, pronounced or imposed in the Republic. 
This implies that a South African military court may sit outside the Republic to 
hear cases which were committed outside the Republic by members 
subjected to the MDSMA/MDC/Defence Act.250 Further the law, which is going 
to be applied, is by implication the South African (military) law. The verdict too 
will be enforced in South Africa and in case of incarceration; it will be served 
in South Africa. The foregoing means the South African (military) court has 
jurisdiction to try a matter involving members of the SANDF which happens 
outside South Africa. 
Section 7 provides that the Minister of Defence shall appoint a Court of 
Military Appeals (hereinafter CMA)251 to try treason, murder, rape, culpable 
homicide and sections 4 and 5 MDC offence252 committed outside the 
Republic. This means the CMA has jurisdiction to try members of the SANDF 
for those specified crimes committed outside South Africa. Further the CMA 
may sit at any place within or outside the borders of South Africa.253 
The Court of Senior Military Judge (hereinafter CSMJ) has jurisdiction to try 
any person subjected to the MDC for any offence whether committed within or 
outside South Africa, the exception being murder, treason, rape or culpable 
homicide committed within the Republic.254 A Court of Military Judge (CMJ) 
has jurisdiction to try any person subjected to the MDC, other than an officer 
of field rank255 or higher rank for any offence, other than murder, treason, rape 
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 The Court of Military Appeals (hereinafter CMA) is established in terms of section 6 of 
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or culpable homicide, or an offence under section 4 and 5.256 This means that 
both the CSMJ and the CMJ has jurisdiction to try an offender subjected to 
the MDC in those specified offence whether committed within or outside 
South Africa.257 
If the jurisdiction of the aforementioned courts is taken together, it results in 
South Africa (military courts) having jurisdiction over its armed force for any 
offence committed while stationed outside South Africa. This gives effect and 
is in conformity with sections 3(1) of MDSMA and 3(1)(a) of SA Defence Act 
discussed above. 
4.3 Botswana legislation 
4.3.1 Botswana Defence Act 13, 1977 
4.3.1(a) BDF outside Botswana 
Botswana Defence Force is established in terms of section 4(1) of the 
Botswana Defence Act 13, 1977 (hereinafter Botswana Defence Act). The 
primary role of the BDF is to defend Botswana and to perform any other task 
as may be determined by the President. The President may at any time order 
that the whole of BDF or part of BDF be employed outside of Botswana.258 
While employed outside of Botswana members of BDF will be subject to 
Botswana laws.259 Members of BDF were employed outside Botswana during 
ONUMOZ, UNOSOM 11 and BOLEAS in fulfilment of the mentioned section. 
During these operations members of BDF were subjected to Botswana 
laws.260  
Section 7(1) authorises the President to order any member of BDF to undergo 
training or employment outside Botswana. Further the President may place 
any member of BDF at the disposal of military of another country for the 
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 Section 10(2) of the MDSMA. 
257
 Ibid n 224 supra. 
258
 Section 6 of Botswana Defence Act. 
259
 Section 172(1) and (2) of Botswana Defence Act. Available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/a24d1cf3344e99934125673e00508142/aa3071dc073984c6c125775200312bdd/$FIL
E/46443107.pdf/Botswana%20-%20Defence%20Force.pdf (Date used 14/0913). 
260
 For a full discussion see para 3.2.5 supra. 
58 
 
purpose of attachment to that armed force.261 The BDF has participated in 
multinational exercises with defence forces of neighbouring countries 
especially SADC forces either in Botswana or outside Botswana.262 
In terms of the aforementioned sections the BDF is mandated to be employed 
outside Botswana either to undergo training or for the purpose of attachment 
to other military authority. During the detachment or training outside Botswana 
the BDF are subjected to Botswana (military) laws. If during the said 
attachment or training, a BDF member commits a crime (as prescribed in Part 
VII of the Botswana Defence Act) he/she will be prosecuted under Botswana 
law meaning Botswana will exercise jurisdiction in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary. Botswana Military Courts have the right to exercise 
jurisdiction under the Botswana Defence Act at all times for offence committed 
outside of Botswana.263 
Certain offences like mutiny if committed by the BDF under the Botswana 
Defence Force carries the death sentence.264 In fact section 68 of the 
Botswana Defence Act provides that death is an appropriate sentence which 
can be handed down by the court martial of the BDF.265 So if BDF members 
commit mutiny while undergoing training in for example South Africa and they 
are tried under Botswana military law by Botswana military court they might 
be sentenced to death. 
A military court of Botswana will be acting within its powers when trying a 
member of the BDF for an offence committed in South Africa.266 The action of 
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a Botswana military court in South Africa will be in line with section 97(1)(a) of 
the SA Defence Act which provides that in matters of discipline and internal 
administration of that force the court or military authority of the visiting force 
may exercise all such powers as are conferred by the law of that country.267 
Committing mutiny will most probably fall within matters of discipline, meaning 
a Botswana military court will have jurisdiction to try the offence. 
As a crime of mutiny carries the death sentence, a Botswana military court will 
be limited in its sentencing. It can only sentence a member of the BDF who 
has committed mutiny in South Africa to a sentence which is not cruel, 
inhuman or degrading. Therefore, the Botswana military court will not be able 
to sentence a BDF member to death sentence while sitting in South Africa for 
an offence of mutiny committed in South Africa.268 This is the requirement of 
section 97(1)(b) of the SA Defence Act which provides that no cruel, inhuman 
or degrading punishment as contemplated in section 12(1)(e) of the SA 
Constitution 1996 may be meted out or administered by a military court or 
other authority (as discussed above) while in South Africa. 
4.3.1(b) Visiting force in Botswana 
The visiting force in Botswana is regulated by section 11 of the Botswana 
Defence Act. The section is not clear with regard to the legal status of the 
visiting force. It does not per se deal with the legal status but more with the 
command of the visiting force. It provides that a member of the visiting force 
has the same powers as a member of the BDF of equivalent rank and should 
be treated as if it is a member of the BDF while in cooperation with the 
BDF.269 Further the President (of Botswana) may decide the question of 
command where a whole or part of the BDF is required to act with another 
military force.270 
Accepting that the question of the legal status of a visiting force while in 
Botswana is not directly or explicitly dealt with by the Botswana Defence Act, 
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it can be argued that if a member of a visiting force (e.g. SANDF) commits an 
offence, for example together with BDF members takes part in mutiny271 while 
attached to the BDF, he/she will be dealt with in terms of the Botswana 
Defence Act. If tried by a Botswana military court, the SANDF member might 
face a death sentence as death sentence is an appropriate sentence for 
mutiny.    
It is not a requirement under the Botswana Defence Act that an agreement 
outlining the legal status of the visiting force should precede the cooperation. 
However, by agreeing on cooperation it could be expected (by implication), 
that states (Botswana and South Africa) will be prepared to compromise on 
some of their sovereign rights.272 
4.3.2 Botswana Penal Code Law 2, 1964 (hereinafter Botswana Penal Code) 
Where a member of a visiting force (SANDF) commits an offence which does 
not qualify as official duty in terms of the Botswana Defence Act or the SA 
Defence Act, for example murdering a civilian while off-duty, he/she will most 
probably273 be prosecuted under Botswana Penal Law. If found guilty and 
there are no extenuating circumstances he/she might be sentenced to death 
by a Botswana civilian court.274 
In the case of Kobedi,275 the applicant was convicted on a number of offences 
including murder and was sentence to death. He applied for the review of the 
trial in the Court of Appeal on a number of constitutional grounds notably the 
constitutionality of sections 203(1), (2) and (3) of the Botswana Penal Code 
which made death sentence obligatory where there are no extenuating 
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circumstances,276 and section 26(1) which prescribed that when any person is 
sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he shall be hanged by the 
neck until he is dead. The court held that apart from fundamental rights to life 
contained inside section 3 of the Botswana Constitution, section 4(1) 
provides: 
No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the 
sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law in force in 
Botswana of which he has been convicted. 
The court held that the Botswana Penal Code is law in Botswana meaning the 
death sentence and its method of carrying it out are part of, and are enshrined 
in, the Constitution by section 4(1) of the Botswana Constitution and cannot, 
therefore, be said to be inconsistent with the same Constitution. The 
argument that execution by hanging amounts to torture or inhuman and 
degrading punishment was saved by section 7(2) of the Constitution 
(Botswana) which authorised any punishment which was lawful before the 
coming into operation of the Constitution. The appeal was therefore 
dismissed.277  
4.4 Southern African Development Community Protocol on Extradition 
(hereinafter SADC Extradition Protocol) 
South Africa278 as well as Botswana are signatories to the SADC Extradition 
Protocol. The main purpose of the SADC Extradition Protocol is to cooperate 
in the prevention and suppression of crime, as increased easy access to free 
cross-border movement enables offenders to escape arrest, prosecution, 
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conviction and punishment.279 Further, every state party agrees to extradite to 
another state party within its jurisdiction any person who is wanted for 
prosecution or enforcement of sentence in the requesting state for an 
extraditable offence.280 The offences or sentences covered under the SADC 
Extradition Protocol are those punishable under both states by imprisonment 
of one year or more or sentences of six months or more.281 
Furthermore, extradition shall be refused if the offence for which extradition is 
requested constitutes an offence under military law and is not an offence 
under ordinary criminal law282 if the person whose extradition is requested has 
been, or would be, subjected in the requesting state to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and if that person would not 
receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings, as contained in 
Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.283  
In addition, the state may refuse extradition if the offence for which extradition 
is requested carries a death penalty under the law of the requesting state. 
Extradition in this case can only be executed if the requesting state gives 
assurance to the requested state that the death penalty will not be imposed 
or, if imposed, will not be carried out.284 
4.4.1 BDF in South Africa and the application of SADC Extradition Protocol 
While in South Africa, BDF members will be subjected to the Botswana 
Defence Act and Military Courts or Authority of Botswana in matters of internal 
discipline and administration of their force.285 Mutiny is one of the offences 
which most probably will fall under matters of discipline and administration.286 
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It is an offence in terms of the Botswana Defence Act, but not an offence in 
terms of Botswana Penal Law.287  
One of the mandatory reasons for refusal to extradite in terms of SADC 
Extradition Protocol is when a crime constitutes a crime under military law but 
not under ordinary criminal law.288 The question therefore arises as to what 
will happen if BDF members commit mutiny while in South Africa as this crime 
is only a crime under military law.289  
So in terms of the SADC Extradition Protocol members of visiting BDF will not 
be extradited back to Botswana to face prosecution if they commit mutiny 
while in South Africa as this offence is a military offence290 and not an offence 
under Botswana Penal Law.291 This means Botswana will not be able to rely 
on SADC Extradition Protocol to extradite and try BDF members who commits 
mutiny while in South Africa.  
If while in South Africa as part of a visiting BDF force, members of the BDF 
commit offence which constitutes an offence in terms of both the Botswana 
Defence Act and the Botswana Penal Law, for example incitement to mutiny, 
these members may be extradited back to Botswana to face trial.292 
Incitement to commit mutiny is an extraditable offence in terms of Article 3(5) 
of the SADC Extradition Protocol. It further carries a life sentence in terms of 
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the Botswana Penal Code293 and may carry a death sentence in terms of the 
Botswana Defence Act.294 
The aforesaid means that armed members of visiting BDF might face death 
the sentence under the Botswana Defence Act if extradited back to Botswana 
for the offence of incitement to mutiny committed while stationed in South 
Africa. However, in South Africa the death penalty constitutes cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.295  And if this interpretation is 
accepted, this will in turn trigger Article 4 (f) of the SADC Extradition Protocol 
which provides that extradition must be refused if the person whose 
extradition is requested would be subjected to torture or cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting state. This means that a 
member of the BDF will not be extradited, because the death sentence 
constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
terms of South African law. This in turn can be classified as a mandatory 
ground for refusal to extradite, meaning that a BDF member will not be 
extradited back to Botswana to stand trial.296 
Another ground where a state may refuse to extradite is where the requested 
person may face the death penalty if convicted. Article 5 of the SADC 
Extradition Protocol provides that extradition may be refused: 
If the offence for which extradition is requested carries a death penalty under 
the law of the Requesting State, unless that State gives such assurance, as 
the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out. 
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Therefore, the government of South Africa may refuse to extradite a member 
of the BDF because incitement to mutiny carries a death sentence in 
Botswana.  
It is required of South Africa to do so in terms of its own national laws. Section 
2 of the Constitution 1996 provides that it (the Constitution) is the supreme 
law of the country and any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. 
Therefore, extradition has to be done in accordance with the law (Constitution 
1996). In this case a member of the BDF will only be extradited to Botswana 
for an offence of incitement to commit mutiny if that member will not be 
subjected to the death penalty. It was held in South Africa that the death 
sentence is inconsistent with the Constitution 1996.297 The South African 
government can do this by seeking assurance from the Botswana government 
that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if it is imposed, it will not be 
carried out.298  
The matter came before the court in the Mohamed case.299 The facts were 
briefly as follows: The South African immigration officials acting in cahoots 
with their American counterparts and removed Mr. Khalfan Mohamed from 
South Africa. Mr. Mohamed was indicted for his alleged involvement in the 
bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. On arrival in 
New York he was charged with various offences related to the bombings and 
he was formally notified that if convicted he faced the death penalty.300 
The main question before the court was the validity of the deportation or 
extradition of Mr. Mahomed involving the possibility of capital punishment.301 
The court found that whether the conduct was deportation or extradition was 
irrelevant. The most pressing and prevalent obligation placed on South Africa 
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by the SA Constitution 1996 when deciding whether to deport or extradite is to 
protect the fundamental rights of the person. In the present case the right to 
human dignity, the right to life and the right not to be treated or punished in a 
cruel, inhuman or degrading way were paramount. The South African 
government could have done this by securing an undertaking from the United 
States authorities that a sentence of death would not be imposed on 
Mohamed, before removing him to that country.302 This means that before 
South Africa can deport or extradite any person to a country where death 
sentence is practice, it is obliged to seek assurance first from that state that 
that person will not be sentenced to death.  
In the matter of Tsebe and Others303 the issue before the Constitutional Court 
was to determine whether or not the government had the power to extradite or 
deport or in any way surrender a person, including an illegal foreigner, to 
another country to stand trial on charges which carry the death penalty even if 
that requesting country is not prepared to give the requisite assurance that 
that person will not be executed.  
The court confirmed the principle laid down in Mohamed304 and held that: 
In terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution the Government is under an 
obligation not to deport or extradite Mr. Phale or in any way to transfer him 
from South Africa to Botswana to stand trial for the alleged murder in the 
absence of the requisite assurance. Should the Government deport or 
extradite Mr. Phale without the requisite assurance, it would be acting in 
breach of its obligations in terms of section 7(2), the values of the Constitution 
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and Mr. Phale’s right to life, right to human dignity and right not to be 
subjected to treatment or punishment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading.305  
The court further reasoned that South Africa acted in accordance with the 
Extradition Treaty between itself and Botswana306 and in accordance with the 
SADC Extradition Protocol in insisting on the requisite assurance from the 
government of Botswana before it could extradite Mr. Tsebe. The appeal was 
therefore dismissed and the decision of the High Court (South Africa) 
confirmed meaning that Mr. Tsebe could not be extradited to Botswana 
without South Africa seeking the necessary assurance from the Botswana 
government that if convicted (in Botswana) he (Mr. Tsebe) will not be hanged. 
The cases of Mahomed and Tsebe have laid down a principle that South 
Africa is obliged and in fact must seek assurance before it can extradite, 
deport or in any way surrender any person (citizen and alien alike) to a 
requesting state where that person might face the death penalty. Applying this 
to  BDF members stationed in South Africa means that BDF members will not 
be deported or extradited or in any way surrendered back to Botswana 
without the necessary assurance that if convicted for a crime like incitement to 
mutiny they will not be hanged.307 
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4.4.2 SANDF in Botswana and the application of Botswana laws and SADC 
Extradition Protocol 
A SANDF member who commits a military offence while in Botswana in which 
only South Africa has interest will be immune from Botswana laws as this will 
most probably fall under the internal discipline and administration of SANDF. 
This will result in that soldier being tried under South African (military) law as 
members of SANDF are subjected to South African laws while on duty outside 
the Republic.308 Where Botswana and South Africa agree that a person must 
be tried in South Africa the question of death penalty will not arise as it was 
declared invalid in Makwanyane.309 
The contentious point is where member/s of the SANDF commit/s crimes 
(military or civilian criminal offences) which are punishable by death310 while 
attached to the BDF, and Botswana asserts its right to exercise jurisdiction 
and refuses to hand over members of the SANDF to South African authorities. 
In the absence of any agreement (dealing with criminal jurisdiction) as 
envisaged by section 92 of the SA Defence Act (discussed above) or an 
agreement implicit in terms of section 7 and 11 of the Botswana Defence Act, 
members of the SANDF will most probably be subjected to Botswana laws 
(Military or Botswana Penal Law) based on the territoriality principle311 and if 
found guilty they might face the death penalty.312 
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4.5 Conclusion  
The relevant legislation of both South Africa and Botswana realised the 
importance of cooperation hence it authorises members of their armed forces 
to cooperate with other forces. The question of jurisdiction is not fully covered; 
however, all legislation gives some form of authority over armed forces to the 
sending state. In all the bilateral agreements analysed great care is taken not 
to encroach upon another contracting party’s sovereignty. 
Both South Africa and Botswana are unequivocal in asserting their 
sovereignty especially in the application and the upholding of their domestic 
laws as manifested in the difference cases. In Tsebe extradition or deportation 
was refused by South Africa unless Botswana gave assurance that its own 
citizen will not be executed. Equally so Marriette Sonjaleen Bosch who was a 
citizen of South Africa was hanged notwithstanding the pressure put on 
Botswana by different groupings.313 
Based on the aforementioned analysis, the question of jurisdiction can only be 
resolved through compromise and agreement by the states concerned. 
                                                                                                                                            
leave for South Africa where they will be protected by the law, and can only be released 
under the affirmative that a death sentence would not be imposed on them. We are a 
republic, not a province of South Africa and we are not going to be put under control of 
another sovereign state in order to apply our laws.” He further said that the accused are 
facing a very serious crime of murder, which carries a severe punishment in Botswana. 
Where no extenuating circumstances are found, the court handling the case is duty bound to 
return a death sentence. The prosecutor concluded his submissions by stating the difficulties 
Botswana government has faced in the past when trying to extradite murder fugitives from 
South Africa, saying there are currently seven murder suspects who escaped to South Africa 
after being charged with murder in Botswana. Available at 
http://72.167.255.126/index.php?sid=1&aid=88&dir=2011/July/Wednesday6. If the 
prosecutor’s comments can be taken to represent those of the Botswana government South 
Africa might find it difficult to get members of the SANDF back in South Africa if they commit 
serious offences while stationed in Botswana (Date used 03/10/13). For a discussion of 
territoriality principle see para 2.5.1 supra. 
312
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When entering into agreement with each other in terms of their national 
(defence) laws, Botswana and South Africa will be guided by their respective 
Constitutions. In general the Constitution of a state is the guiding document 
which stipulates which actions can be taken and which actions cannot be 
taken. Failure to adhere to one’s Constitution might render the actions taken 
invalid.314 
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the country; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA IN 
RESPECT OF THEIR ARMED FORCES 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996315 
The SA Constitution 1996 was signed into law on 10 December 1996 and 
came into effect on 04 February 1997.316  The SA Constitution 1996 ushered 
in a society based on democratic values and fundamental human rights. It laid 
the foundation for a democratic society in which every citizen is equally 
protected by law.317 
The society envisaged by the SA Constitution 1996 is one founded on the 
following values (amongst others): human dignity, advancement of human 
rights, the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.318 Chapter Two 
of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights is a 
cornerstone of democracy; it enshrines the rights of all people in the 
country.319 
The SANDF is established in terms of section 199(1) and (2) of the SA 
Constitution of 1996. The primary role of the SANDF is to defend and protect 
the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the 
Constitution and principles of international law.320 The SANDF can also be 
employed in fulfilment of an international obligation.321 
 
                                                 
315
 Hereinafter SA Constitution 1996. 
316
 The SA Constitution 1996 was signed by President Nelson Mandela at Sharpeville; he 
brought to a close a long and bitter struggle to establish democracy in South Africa. 
317
 Overview and Preamble to the SA Constitution1996. 
318
 Section 1(a) and (c) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
319
 Section 7(a) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
320
 Section 200(2) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
321
 Section 201(c) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
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5.1.2 The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana 1966322 
The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana came into effect on 30 
September 1966 after Botswana became a sovereign and independent state. 
The Constitution blended most of the traditional features of the British 
Westminster Parliamentary model323 with other features imported from 
elsewhere.324 Chapter II of the Botswana Constitution contains the 
fundamental rights and freedom of an individual. The Botswana Constitution is 
silent on the question of supremacy, the question whether it is the supreme 
law of the country or not, is not answered within the text. 
Furthermore, the Constitution is silent on the question of the establishment of 
the Botswana Defence Force. The Botswana Constitution only talks about the 
command of the armed forces.325 
5.2 The applicable sections of the South Africa Constitution 1996 
5.2.1 Section 2: Supremacy of Constitution 
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled. 
The aforementioned section means that all laws and conducts (Department of 
Defence included) in South Africa are subjected to the Constitution. Sections 
198,326 199327 and 200328 of the SA Constitution reaffirms the supremacy of 
                                                 
322
 Hereinafter Botswana Constitution. Available at 
http://www.botswanaembassy.org/files/constitution_of_botswana.pdf. (Date used 03/11/13). 
323
 The model works on the basis of parliamentary supremacy, a system in which parliament 
is allowed to change any law and its legislation cannot be challenged in the courts. This 
results in parliament having a great deal of power. Available at 
http://ourgoverningprinciples.wordpress.com/the-uks-westminster-system/. (Date used 
06/11/13). 
324
 Botswana has an executive president who holds all executive powers in contrast with the 
Westminster model which have a prime minister as the holder of these executive powers. 
Available at http://www.parliament.gov.bw/about-parliament/history. (Date used 03/11/12). 
325
 Section 48 of Botswana Constitution. 
326
 Section 198(b) of SA Constitution 1996 provides that the principle governing national 
security is: “The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen 
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the Constitution in relation to the security services. The aforementioned 
sections impose a duty on the SANDF to observe and act in accordance with 
the Constitution. 
In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence329 Sachs J 
while dealing with section 198, 199 and 200 of the SA Constitution 1996 had 
this to say: 
These provisions clearly contemplate conscientious soldiers of the 
Constitution who can be expected to fulfil their constitutional duties more 
effectively if the values of the Constitution extend in appropriate manner to 
them and infuse their lives in the armed forces.330  
This means that the SANDF as an organisation is subjected to the 
Constitution and members of the SANDF enjoy most of the rights enshrined in 
the Constitution and, furthermore, members are expected to act in 
accordance with the Constitution.  
In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others331 
the constitutionality of certain regulations332 promulgated in terms of the SA 
                                                                                                                                            
from participating in armed conflict nationally or internationally except as provided for in terms 
of the Constitution or national law.” 
327
 Section 199(1) provides that “the security service of South Africa consists of a single 
defence force… established in terms of the Constitution.” Section 199(5) provides that “the 
security service must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international 
agreements binding on the Republic.” 
328
 Section 200(2) provides that “the primary object of defence force is to defend the 
Republic… in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law 
regulating the use of force.” 
329
 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC). This 
case concerns the question whether it is constitutional to prohibit members of the armed 
forces from participating in public protest action and from joining trade unions. On 25 
November 1998, the High Court made an order which in substance declared section 126B of 
the Defence Act, 44 of 1957, to be unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it prohibits 
members of the South African National Defence Force from participating in public protest and 
from joining trade unions. The order was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.   
330
 Id n 329 supra at para 47. 
331
 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (5) SA 400 
(CC). The case concerns dispute regarding collective bargaining (as provided for in section 
23 of the SA Constitution 1996) that arisen between the South African National Defence 
Union (hereinafter SANDU) and SANDF. It originated in five separate applications, each 
launched by SANDU in High Court. The applications were consolidated into three hearings in 
which three judgments were handed down by three different judges of the High Courts. All 
three were appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals which handed down two judgments in 
which SANDU approached the Constitutional Court. 
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Defence Act were challenged. The Constitutional Court found that regulation 
8(b) is inconsistent with the Constitution and was declared invalid. 
Regulations 25 and 27 were declared unconstitutional to the extent that they 
limit the right to fair labour practice. Regulation 37 was found to be 
constitutional as the regulation ensured that the SANDF was able to fulfil its 
constitutional mandate. 
This above analysis shows that the SANDF as an organisation is subjected to 
the Constitution and its members enjoy the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. When passing regulations or contemplating any action in terms 
of the SA Defence Act, the SANDF has to comply with constitutional 
requirements, failure to do so will render the conduct invalid. By analogy, 
when negotiating defence cooperation agreements in terms of section 92(1) of 
the SA Defence Act with another country, for example Botswana, the SANDF 
has to take cognisance of the constitutional imperatives. It means when the 
SANDF intends sending its armed forces abroad the agreement authorising 
the action is expected to pass constitutional scrutiny. Failure to adhere to 
these constitutional imperatives will render the agreement invalid. The 
members of the SANDF remain part of South African society with obligations 
and rights of citizens.333 
5.2.2 Section 3 Citizenship 
Section 3(2)(a) of the SA Constitution 1996 provides that all citizens334 are 
equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship. Section 
7(2) of the SA Constitution further provides that the state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 7(2) may be 
interpreted to impose both positive and negative duties on the state. In the 
case of rights of citizens335 to life,336 this means the state has both a legal duty 
                                                                                                                                            
332
 Amongst the regulations challenged were; regulation 8 insofar as it imposes limits on 
protest action by members of the SANDF, regulations 25(a) and (b) and regulation 27, to the 
extent that they prohibit military trade union representatives from representing their members 
in respect of grievance and disciplinary proceedings, but only permit them to “assist” their 
members, regulation 37 to the extent that it imposes a complete ban on the activities of a 
military trade union during military training and operations. 
333
 Ibid n 332 supra. 
334
 Ibid. 
335
 Section 3(2)(a) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
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not to take life as well as a legal duty to protect its inhabitants from possible 
death.337  
This positive legal duty was relied upon in the case of Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security338 wherein in the course of a discussion of section 8(1) 
of the SA Constitution 1996 stated the following: 
It follows that there is a duty imposed on the state and all of its organs not to 
perform any act that infringes these rights. In some circumstances there 
would also be a positive component which obliges the state and its organs to 
provide appropriate protection to everyone through laws and structures 
designed to afford such protection.339  
If we adopt the approach followed by the Constitutional Court in Carmichele 
and by analogy we take a situation where South Africa lawfully sends its 
armed forces to another country, it means that the South African government 
will be under a legal obligation to ensure that its armed forces are protected 
from a potential death sentence.340 It can protect its armed forces by insisting 
in any agreement it signs with another country that the death sentence will not 
be carried out. 
                                                                                                                                            
336
 Section 11 of the SA Constitution 1996. 
337
 Id 298 at 285. Ngcobo J in Kaunda (see id n 341 infra) while dealing with section 7(2) of 
SA Constitution 1996 with regard to citizens had this to say: “What section 7(2) does on the 
other hand is to bind the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights. Here it must be borne in mind that the right to citizenship is constitutionally entrenched 
in the Bill of Rights. It is clear from section 3(2)(a) that, in addition to certain rights, there are 
benefits and privileges to which South African citizens are entitled. In this sense, sections 3(2) 
and 7(2) must be read together as defining the obligations of the government in relation to its 
citizens”. According to the afore passage the court does not take the alleged offence or 
circumstance surrounding the alleged or the motive of the offence into account, South Africa 
is under legal obligation to discharge its constitutional obligation and to protect its citizen by 
virtue of them being citizen, if the rights in the Bill of Rights are to be realised (at para 176). 
338
 Carmichelle v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). The case involves a 
serial offender who was released on bail pending his trial. He went on to commit crime while 
out on bail. The applicant sued the state in that it failed in its legal duty to protect her. 
Available at http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZACC/2001/22.pdf. (Date used 27/11/13). See 
also Id n 298 supra at 285. 
339
 Id n 338 supra at para 44. Further, in the course of discussion of the common-law duties of 
the state to protect life, the court adopted the positive dimension of Article 2(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and held at para 45: It is common ground that the 
State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by 
putting in place effective criminal law provision… It is thus accepted by those appearing 
before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined 
circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures 
to protect an individual whose life is at risk from criminal acts of another individual [or acts of 
another state]. 
340
 Ibid n 337 supra. Members of armed forces are citizens with rights enjoyed by all citizens.   
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In the case of Kaunda341 Chaskalson CJ writing for majority had this to say: 
… The applicants were not removed from South Africa by the government, or 
with government’s assistance. They left South Africa voluntary and now find 
themselves in difficulty… Their arrest in Zimbabwe, the criminal charges 
brought against them there, and the possibility of them being extradited from 
Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea are not the result of any unlawful conduct on 
the part of the government or of the breach of any duty it owed to them.342 
The inference which can be drawn from Kaunda is that where a person is 
removed from South Africa by or with the consent of the government, the 
government is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that that person’s 
rights are protected. The government can do this by seeking assurance from 
the requesting state before delivering/sending that person that he/she will not 
be sentenced to death.343 Once the person is removed from South Africa the 
SA Constitution 1996 no longer applies.344  
If the inference drawn from Kaunda case is applied to the SANDF, it will follow 
that South Africa is under a constitutional obligation to protect the rights of 
members of the SANDF. If, for example, it considers sending members of the 
SANDF to Botswana, it must take positive steps to ensure that these 
members are protected from possible death sentence. These positive steps 
                                                 
341
 Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC). The 
applicants were arrested in Zimbabwe on 7 March 2004. On 9 March 2004, a group of 15 
men were arrested in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, and accused of being 
mercenaries and plotting a coup against the President of Equatorial Guinea. The majority of 
the detainees were South African nationals. The applicants feared that they were going to be 
extradited from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea and put on trial with those who were arrested 
there. They contended that if that happened they were not going to get a fair trial and, if 
convicted, they stood the risk of being sentenced to death. Available at 
http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZACC/2004/5.pdf. (Date used 16/11/13). 
342
 Id n 341 at para 50. See also Ibid n 332 supra. 
343
 Id n 299 supra at para 61. The Director of the Constitutional Court in Mahomed case was 
ordered to deliver the copy of the judgment to US Federal Court in New York. 
344
 Ibid n 341 supra. The court accepted that the state has an obligation under section 7(2) of 
the SA Constitution 1996. However, that does not mean that the rights in nationals have 
under the constitution attach to them when they are outside of South Africa or that the state 
has an obligation under section 7(2)… which extend beyond its borders (Kaunda para 32). 
With regard to extra-territoriality of the constitution the court held: The starting point of enquiry 
into extraterritoriality is… In that respect it is territorially bound and has no application beyond 
our borders. Secondly, the rights in the Bill of Rights… on which reliance is placed… Clearly, 
they lose the benefit of that protection when they move beyond our borders. Does section 
7(2)…, and attaches to them when in foreign countries (para 36)? Section 7(1)… The bearers 
of rights are people in South Africa. Nothing suggests that it is to have general application, 
beyond our borders (para 37). See further para 44. 
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may be in the form of terms and conditions which are included in an 
agreement which it considers signing with Botswana.  
In peacekeeping operations in which South Africa sent its armed forces, the 
sending of armed forces were preceded by agreements in which the question 
of criminal jurisdiction was addressed. In all those agreements South Africa 
retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction, meaning its armed forces were 
protected from foreign legal systems and therefore meaning their rights were 
protected i.e. they were not exposed to possible death sentence. It means 
that the South African government discharged its constitutional obligation in 
terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution wherein it is obliged to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.345 In fact, this is the 
attitude of the South African government in sending its armed forces 
abroad.346  
5.2.3 Section 8: Application of the Bill of Rights  
Section 8(1) of the SA Constitution 1996 provides that the Bill of Rights 
applies to all laws, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and 
all organs of state. Therefore, the Department of Defence as an organ of 
state347 is bound by the Bill of Rights because it is performing a function in 
terms of the Constitution.348 In most of the cases where the SANDU took the 
SANDF to court the disputes involved allegations of not complying with 
constitutional obligations especially the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.349 
This shows that the Bill of Rights applies equally to the SANDF.  
 
                                                 
345
 For a discussion of the peacekeeping operations agreements see paras 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 
supra. Once members of the SANDF are in Botswana the rights in the SA Constitution 1996 
cannot be enforced in Botswana or invoked in Botswana court. However, South Africa is 
under constitutional obligation to assist its citizens through international relations. Exactly how 
the assistance must be is the question for the executive to decide.  See Id n 2298 at 63–4 and 
287. 
346
 Ibid n 27 supra. 
347
 In terms of section 239 of the SA Constitution 1996 an organ of state means any 
department of state or administration in the national provincial or local sphere of government 
or any functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the 
constitution or a provincial constitution. 
348
 The South African National Defence Force was established by section 224(1) of the 
Interim Constitution, 1993 and continues to exist. See also section 11 of the SA Defence Act.  
349
 Ibid n 332 and 333 supra.  
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5.2.4 Section 9: Equality 
Section 9(1) provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law. Section 9(3) further provides that: 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more of the grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.350 
The aforesaid section means the state, (including the SANDF), may not 
discriminate against anyone on any of the listed grounds. In the case of the 
SANDF it means it may not unfairly discriminate against any of its soldiers on 
any of the listed grounds.351 
The dispute regarding the application of section 9(3) of the SA Constitution 
1996 in the SANDF came before the court in case of SA Security Forces 
Union v Surgeon General.352 The basis of this application involved the 
constitutionality of certain health requirements (policies) of the SANDF 
regarding the recruitment, deployment and promotion of HIV positive soldiers. 
In brief, the challenged requirement stated that an HIV positive person could 
not be recruited into the SANDF353 and HIV positive soldiers could not be 
                                                 
350
 Section 105 of the SA Defence Act has a similar provision. It provides that any member of 
the Defence Force… whose verbal or physical conduct denigrates, humiliates or shows 
hostility or aversion to any other person on the grounds of that person’s race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language or birth, is guilty of an offence… Clause number 
nine of the Code of Conduct for Uniformed Members of the South African National Defence 
Force provides: “I will treat all people fairly and respect their rights and dignity at all times, 
regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, culture, language or sexual orientation.” The 
aforementioned section and clause give effect to section 9(3) of the SA Constitution. 
351
 Ibid. 
352
 SA Security Forces Union v Surgeon General 2008 SA 217 (GNP). Available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/217.pdf. (Date used 20/11/13). In this case the 
respondent (SANDF) and the applicants (SA Security Forces Union representing SANDF 
members and an aspirant member) agreed that the HIV testing policy and its implementation 
were unconstitutional. They sought an order of the court confirming their agreement. The 
disputed point was whether the HIV positive recruit (third applicant) must be allowed entry into 
and be a member of the SANDF. The court held that his case is sui generis and ordered the 
SANDF to immediately employ the HIV recruit. The SANDF was further ordered to consider 
the second applicant for external deployment and/or promotion. 
353
 The third applicant was requested by the SANDF to apply for recruitment into the SANDF 
because he was a well qualified musician and a trumpeter. He then went through all medical 
tests and everything was in order until the SANDF found out that he was HIV positive. Based 
on his HIV positive status, he was refused entry and membership of the SANDF. 
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deployed externally as part of UN missions and therefore not promoted. The 
court held that the testing policy was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably 
and unjustifiably infringed aspirant and current HIV positive SANDF members’ 
rights not to be unfairly discriminated against in terms of section (9)(3) of the 
SA Constitution of 1996.354  
The above analysis shows that members of the SANDF enjoy the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, they cannot be unfairly discriminated and they enjoy equal 
protection of the law. The courts are not hesitant to order the SANDF to 
comply with the Constitution. 
5.2.5 Section 10: Human Dignity 
Section 10 of the SA Constitution 1996 provides that everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected. Human 
dignity is one of the founding values of the Constitution.355 In Makwanyane the 
Constitutional Court described the right to human dignity and the right to life 
as the most important human rights,356 and that the right to dignity is 
intrinsically linked to all other human rights.357  
According to the Constitutional Court the right to human dignity is central to all 
other human rights. It is also a value that informs the interpretation of many, 
possibly all, other rights.358 It is the most important of all the rights. It is one of 
the non-derogatory rights; exceptional circumstances must exist before such 
derogation can be justified.359  
                                                 
354
 The other rights which were infringed by this testing policy were; the right to privacy in 
terms of section 14, the right to dignity in terms of section 10, the right to fair labour practice in 
terms of section 23 and the right to just administrative action in terms of section 33. 
355
 Section 1(a) of the SA Constitution 1996. The other founding values are equality, human 
rights and freedoms. In Carmichele Id n 338 supra at para 56 the Constitutional Court held 
that: “Society’s notions of what justice demand might well have to be replaced, or 
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied 
in the Constitution.” Available at http://www.saflii.org.za/za/cases/ZACC/2001/22.pdf (Date 
used 27/11/13). See also Id n 298 at 272 and n 1. 
356
 Id n 239 supra at para 144. See also Id n 298 supra at 273–4. 
357
 Id n 239 supra at para 328. See also Id n 298 supra at 274. 
358 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Shalabi and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). Available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/8.pdf. 
(Date used 27/11/13). 
359
 Section 37(5)(c) of the SA Constitution 1996. 
80 
 
In the SA Security Forces Union360 case it was held that the testing policy of 
the SANDF was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably and unjustifiably 
infringed aspirant and current HIV positive SANDF members’ rights to human 
dignity.361 
From the above analysis it means members of the SANDF must at all times 
be treated with human dignity. When issuing any regulation or contemplating 
any action, the SANDF must ensure that the dignity of its soldiers is protected. 
Human dignity is one of the founding values and source of all other personal 
rights, it is almost impossible to justify the limitation of this right.362 If for 
example the SANDF intends sending its armed force to Botswana as part of a 
cooperation agreement with that country, it must ensure that the dignity of its 
members will be protected at all times.363  
5.2.6 Section 11: The right to life 
Section 11 of the SA Constitution 1996 provides that everyone has the right to 
life. The right to life in the SA Constitution is textually unqualified. In 
Makwanyane the Constitutional Court used this to support an argument that 
the right to life is given stronger protection in the SA Constitution of 1993.364 
The right to life in the SA Constitution 1993 was contrasted with the 
corresponding constitutions of other jurisdictions in which the right to life is 
qualified.365 The state has a duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.366 In the case of the right to life, this translates into 
both negative and positive duties. The right to life can also be interpreted 
                                                 
360
 Ibid n 352 supra. 
361
 Ibid n 353 supra. 
362
 Ibid n 358 and 357 supra. 
363
 Ibid n 345 supra. 
364
 Id n 239 supra at para 85. 
365
 Id n 239 at para 86. Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
that everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. (Date used 28/11/13). Article 6(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life. Available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf. 
(date used 28/11/13). See also Id n 298 at 281.  
366
 Ibid n 340 supra. 
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positively as placing a duty on the state to protect the lives of its citizens.367 In 
Makwanyane the Constitutional Court held that the state is obliged to take 
action to protect human life.368 
If we apply the above analysis to the SANDF it means the SANDF is obliged 
to protect the lives of its members.369 If the SANDF intends sending its armed 
forces for example to Botswana, it (the SANDF) must take positive steps to 
ensure that its members are not exposed to possible death sentence.370 In 
fact South Africa does not have any other option; it must ensure that no 
SANDF member will be hanged in Botswana. 
5.2.7 Section 12: The Right to Freedom and Security of a Person 
Section 12(1)(e) provides that everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of the person which includes the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.371  
5.3 Selected sections from the Botswana Constitution 
5.3.1 Supremacy of the Botswana Constitution 
The Botswana Constitution does not contain any explicit provision stating that 
the Constitution is the supreme law. However, it can be inferred from the 
decision of the courts that the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
country.372 In Clover Petrus and Another,373 the constitutionality of section 2374 
of the Botswana Criminal Procedure and Evidence (Amendment) Act of 1994 
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 Ibid n 340 and 341 supra. 
368
 Id n 239 supra at para 117. 
369
 Ibid n 344 supra. 
370
 Ibid n 345 and 346 supra. 
371
 For an analysis of this section see sub-heading 4.2.1(c) para 4 supra. 
372
 Nsereko N Constitutional Law in Botswana (2004) at 36. 
373
 Petrus and Another v The State 1984 BLR 14 (CA). Amongst the questions before the 
court was whether certain forms of punishment violated section 7 of Botswana Constitution 
which provides that no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment. Available at 
http://www.elaws.gov.bw/desplaylrpage.php?id=1834&dsp=2. (Date used 30/11/13). See also 
Id n 368 supra at 36.  
374
 This section amended section 301(3) of the Botswana Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Act of 1984. The said section provided that where a person is sentence under sections 235, 
297, 298 and 305 to 308 of Botswana Penal Law, that person must undergo specified 
corporal punishment which must be meted out in specified quarters during the term of 
imprisonment.  
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was challenged. The court found that the said section was inconsistent with 
Section 7 of the Botswana Constitution in that the infliction of delayed 
repeated corporal punishment to be inhumane “destitute of natural kindness 
or pity; brutal, unfeeling, barbarous, cruel.”375 
With regard to the assertion made by the state that in Botswana the National 
Assembly is supreme, thereby implying that there is not much the courts can 
do once the National Assembly has passed a piece of legislation, the 
Botswana Court of Appeal376 had this to say: 
This is of course, erroneous; it is a misconception of the powers of this court 
in regard to legislation which is being challenged as being ultra vires the 
Constitution. Under a written Constitution such as we have in the Republic of 
Botswana, the National Assembly is supreme only in the exercise of 
legislative powers. It is not supreme in the sense that it can pass any 
legislation even if it is ultra vires any provision of the Constitution. I believe it 
is clear, and this point must be strongly made, that every piece of legislation 
is subject to the scrutiny of the courts at the instance of any citizen, or indeed 
                                                 
375
 Ibid n 374 supra. In the case of Attorney-General v Dow 1992 BLR 119 (CA). The facts of 
this case were: Unity Dow, a female citizen of Botswana who was married to Peter Nathan 
Dow, an American citizen, brought the action. She applied for an order declaring sections 4 
and 5 of the Botswana Citizenship Act of 1982 as ultra vires the Constitution on the grounds 
that they violated section 3, guaranteeing equal treatment under the law, and section 15 
granting protection against discrimination. A child was born to them in 1979, prior to their 
marriage in 1984. Two more children were born to them subsequent to the marriage. In terms 
of sections 4 and 5 of the Citizenship Act of 1982, the first-born child was a citizen of 
Botswana, whereas the last two born during the marriage were not. Unity Dow challenged the 
constitutionality of these provisions, contending that they discriminated against her and other 
women in similar circumstances. The discrimination lay in the fact that while male citizens 
married to foreign women could pass their Botswana citizenship on to the children of their 
marriage, a female citizen married to a foreign male could not do the same. The Attorney-
General, on behalf of the Government, argued inter alia that the word ‘sex’ is not mentioned 
among the identified categories in the definition of ‘discriminatory’ treatment in section 15(3); 
that this omission of sex was intentional and was made in order to permit legislation in 
Botswana which was discriminatory on grounds of sex; and that discrimination on grounds of 
sex must be permitted in Botswana society as the society is patrilineal and therefore male-
oriented. The principle of inclusio unius exclusio alterious, to which effect is given in section 
33 of the Botswana Interpretation Act, was also invoked. By a majority of three to two, the full 
bench of the Botswana Court of Appeal held that section 4 of the Citizenship Act of 1982 
violated Sections 3 and 15 of Botswana Constitution and was therefore ultra vires. Available 
at http://www.elaws.gov.bw/desplaylrpage.php?id=2692&dsp=2. (Date used 30/11/13). See 
also Fombad “Botswana introductory notes” University of Pretoria, South Africa. Available at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/Botswana(1).pdf. (Date used 30/11/13). 
376
 The Botswana Court of Appeal is the apex court, the highest and final court in the land. 
The court is the final arbiter of all legal matters in Botswana. Available at 
http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Administration-of-Justice-AOJ/About-
AOJ1/The-Hierarchy-of-the-Courts/ (Date used 30/11/13). 
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in an appropriate case at the instance of a non-citizen living in the country… 
to challenge the constitutionality of the legislation.377 
Based on the above analysis it can be concluded that the Botswana 
Constitution is the supreme law of the country and any law inconsistent with it 
will be declared invalid. This conclusion means that the BDF is subjected to 
the Botswana Constitution and any action it considers must be in line with the 
Constitution. If the BDF contemplates entering into an agreement with another 
country, for example South Africa, it must do so within the prescript and ambit 
of the Botswana Constitution.  
 5.3.2 Section 4: Protection of right to life 
Section 4(1) of Botswana Constitution provides that:  
No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the 
sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law in force in 
Botswana of which he has been convicted. 
The above section does not protect the right to life in positive terms. It 
protects this right in negative terms by merely preventing the intentional 
deprivation of life.378 Furthermore, the aforementioned section does not wholly 
protect the right to life, it limits the right (“save in”) by authorising the death 
sentence in certain circumscribed situations.379 Offences which carry death 
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 Ibid. 
378
 Id n 372 supra at 252. See also Tshosa “The death penalty in Botswana” at 3. Available at 
http://www.biicl.org/files/2216_tshosa_death_penalty_botswana.pdf. (Date used 30/11/13). 
Most of international instruments and domestic constitutions cast the right in a positive. Article 
3 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights holds that: Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of a person. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. Article 6(1) of International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides: Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf. (Date used 30/11/13). Section 
9 of the SA Constitution 1996 provides that everyone has the right to life. The reason for 
Botswana casting this right in a negative form might be that it assume that the right to life is a 
given. Instead it focuses on corresponding obligation of other people, including the state to 
respect the individual’s right to live by not taking his/her life or causing his/her death 
intentionally. 
379
 The exception where life can be limited are; sentence of death passed by a Botswana 
court, for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property, to effect a 
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of person from lawful custody, for purpose of 
suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or in order to prevent the commission by that person 
of a criminal offence. 
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sentences in Botswana are inter alia murder, treason, piracy, mutiny and 
failure to suppress mutiny.  
The constitutionality of the death sentence came before the Botswana Court 
of Appeal on a number of occasions. In Mosarwana v State,380 the appellant 
was convicted of murdering the deceased for calling him a thief. The High 
Court of Botswana sentenced him to death in accordance with section 203(1) 
of the Botswana Penal Code. It also found that there were no extenuating 
circumstances and in accordance with section 26(1) of the Botswana Penal 
Code ordered that the appellant be hanged. 
On appeal to the Botswana Court of Appeal, the appellant argued, inter alia, 
that section 203(1) of the Botswana Penal Code permitting the death penalty 
was ultra vires the Constitution since section 4 prohibits the intentional taking 
of life. The court held that section 203(1) of the Botswana Penal Code 
prescribing the death penalty was not inconsistent with the Botswana 
Constitution. The Court noted that, while there was international sentiment, as 
reflected at the United Nations, to abolish the death penalty, it could not 
rewrite the Botswana Constitution in order to give effect to such sentiment. Its 
function in the interpretation of the Botswana Constitution was adjudicatory 
and not legislative.381 
In the case of Ntesang v The State382 the first question before the court was 
whether the death sentence was ultra vires the Constitution. The second 
question was whether the method of carrying it out i.e. by hanging, constitute 
torture, inhuman and degrading punishment, therefore unconstitutional. The 
first question was answered applying section 4(1) of Botswana Constitution 
which provides that:  
                                                 
380
 Mosarwana v State Criminal Appeal No. 56/1994 (CA) (unreported). Information on this 
case see Tshosa Id n 378 supra at 4. 
381
 Ibid. 
382
 Ntesang v The State (Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1994) 1995 BLR 151 (CA). This case was 
an appeal from the High Court of Botswana. The appellant was convicted of murder and as 
no extenuating circumstances were found, he was sentenced to death by hanging in terms of 
the Botswana Penal Code. He appealed inter alia the sentence and the method in which the 
sentenced was carried out. Available at http://www.saflii.org.za/bw/cases/BWCA/1995/12.pdf. 
(Date used 01/12/13). 
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No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the 
sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law in force in 
Botswana of which he has been convicted. 
The court reasoned that the sentence was in line with section 4(1) of the 
Botswana Constitution as the sentence was handed by a Botswana court.383 
The second question was answered by applying section 7(1) of the Botswana 
Constitution which authorised any punishment which was lawful before 
Botswana became independent. Death by hanging was a lawful punishment 
in the former Protectorate of Bechuanaland. On the submission by the 
defence council on the progressive movement taking place over the death 
sentence in particular by hanging, and the Resolution of the United Nations as 
to the abolition of the death penalty, the court held it has no power to re-write 
the Constitution. This, the court held, is the work for the legislature.384 
From the above analysis it is clear that the death sentence is a competent 
verdict for certain specified offences under specified circumstances.385 If we 
apply the aforesaid analysis to members of the SANDF who are sent to 
Botswana for the purpose of training it means that if SANDF members commit 
a specified offence which carries the death sentence, they might be 
sentenced to death in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 
Botswana will be acting intra vires its Constitution. 
5.4 Conclusion 
It has been shown from the analysis of the Constitutions of the two countries 
(South Africa and Botswana) that both countries zealously apply their 
Constitutions. The courts of both countries do not hesitate to order the other 
branches of government to comply with the Constitution. The Constitutions of 
both countries are supreme and any law or conduct which is inconsistent with 
these Constitutions is invalid.  
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In South Africa members of armed forces enjoy all the rights enjoyed by 
citizens. The government is obliged to take positive steps to protect members 
of the SANDF. The government cannot expose members of the SANDF to a 
possible death sentence. In Botswana members of BDF enjoys most of the 
rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
The contentious point with regard to the application of the constitutional 
provision of both countries is that in South Africa the death sentence is 
unlawful and in Botswana the death sentence is an appropriate sentence for 
certain offences. Both countries jealously protect their sovereignty by applying 
their laws. So if the two countries assert their sovereignty it will end in a 
deadlock. However, by agreeing to cooperate they should be willing to 
compromise on some of their sovereign rights. 
Before compromising on some of their sovereign rights during the conclusion 
of defence cooperation agreements, the two countries might look to other 
developed countries to see how these countries have approached the 
question of criminal jurisdiction over their armed forces that are stationed 
abroad. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENTS ON THE STATUS OF FORCES 
CONCLUDED BY SELECTED COUNTRIES/ORGANISATIONS 
6.1 Introduction  
The question of immunity of foreign armed forces stationed on foreign territory 
was firstly developed for warships visiting foreign harbours where they were 
presumed to be exempt from the host country’s authorities.386 Thus in the 
Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon387 the US Supreme Court accepted that 
jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is exclusive and absolute, 
however, national war ships entering the port of friendly power with the 
consent of that friendly power, are considered to be exempted from its 
jurisdiction.388 
During World War I the principle of the law of the flag dominated.389 The 
rationale was that jurisdictional competence could not be separated from 
matters of disciplinary powers as both are an essential part of any military 
organisation.390  
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 Brownlie Principle of International Law (1990) at 325-6. See also id n 50 supra at 12. 
Foreign naval vessels frequently called into the ports of friendly states to replenish supplies or 
for repairs and this too brought commercial advantage to receiving states. 
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 The Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon and Others Supreme Court of the United State 
(1812) 11 U.S. 116; 3 L. Ed. 287, 7 Cr. 116. The case was brought before the court by a US 
citizen whose vessel was confiscated by France. Available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-01-Taylor/SCSL-03-01-I-032/SCSL-03-01-I-032-IV.pdf. (Date used 
11/12/13). 
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 Id n 387 supra at 136 and 146. The dictum in Schooner did not envisage a situation where 
foreign forces were stationed for a long period in the host country, the case dealt with criminal 
jurisdiction during passage. See also Id n 50 supra at 12. See also Lazareff Status of Military 
Forces under Current International Law (1971) at 13-15. See further Stanger International 
Law Studies 1957–1958 Criminal Jurisdiction over Visiting Armed Forces (1965) at 112–113. 
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 Lazareff Status of Military Forces under Current International Law (1971) at 19–23. The 
agreement of 14 August 1914 between Belgium and France provided that “every force retain 
its jurisdiction as to the offences liable to bring prejudice to it, whatever territory it is stationed 
on, and whatever the nationality of the offender”. The agreement of 15 December 1915 
between France and United Kingdom too recognised the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals 
of their respective forces over their members in whatever territory and of whatever nationality 
the accused may be. Equally so, the agreement between the United States and United 
Kingdom of 1918 provided for exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state. However, the United 
Kingdom had always insisted on territorial sovereignty. See also Stanger International Law 
Studies 1957–1958 Criminal Jurisdiction over Visiting Armed Forces (1965) at 115–119. 
390
 Ibid. 
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During World War II the status of forces was modified. Most of the Allied 
Forces were stationed in the forward zone, i.e. United Kingdom, and were 
regulated by the Allied Forces Act (3 and 4 Geo VI, ch. 51). The Act gave 
jurisdiction to the Allied Military Courts only for questions of discipline and 
administration regarding the members of the forces meaning the sending and 
the receiving states had concurrent jurisdiction.391 The only state which has 
always tried to claim exclusive jurisdiction was the United States while the 
United Kingdom favoured territorial sovereignty.392  
The need, after World War II, for a multilateral as opposed to bilateral 
agreements on the status of forces arose. This need manifested itself in the 
signing of the Treaty of Brussels.393 For the implementation of a collective 
security system, the treaty was followed by the signing of the Agreement on 
the Status of Members of the Armed Forces of the Signatory Powers of the 
Treaty of Brussels.394 This agreement laid the foundation for the later signing 
of the Status of the NATO Forces.395 
6.2 United States of America 
6.2.1 Criminal Jurisdiction under Agreements entered into by the United 
States of America and other States prior to the conclusion of NATO SoFA 
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 Lazareff Status of Military Forces under Current International Law (1971) 23–24. 
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 When the US declared war against Germany it claimed exclusive jurisdiction over all 
criminal offences committed in the UK by members of its armed forces who were stationed in 
the UK. The UK reluctantly obliged as it was in a weak bargaining position (The Home 
Secretary, introducing the United States of America (Visiting Force) Bill, Hansard, H.C. 
Available at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1942/aug/04/united-states-of-
america-visiting-forces#column_877. (Date used 12/12/13). See also Id n 50 supra at 15–28). 
See also Stanger International Law Studies 1957–1958 Criminal Jurisdiction over Visiting 
Armed Forces (1965) at 129-131. See further Id n 391 supra at 24–26. 
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 The Treaty was signed in Brussels on the 17 March 1948. Member states were Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The main purpose was to 
organise collective security. Available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17072.htm. (Date used 14/12/13). See also 
Id n 391 supra at 45. 
394
 Id n 391 supra at 45–47. The agreement was signed on 21 December 1949 in London. On 
the question of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction it provided that: Territorial sovereignty 
was paramount, it encouraged members to respect the laws in force in the receiving state. 
Secondly the receiving state enjoyed an exclusive right of jurisdiction only when the offence 
against its laws was not at the same time punishable under the law of the sending state. 
Thirdly if the offence was punishable under both the law of both the sending and the receiving 
state both state could exercise jurisdiction. The sending state never enjoyed exclusive right of 
jurisdiction. 
395
 Id n 50 at 101.  
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The US legislation and agreements in respect of the status of their armed 
forces were heavily influenced by the Schooner Exchange case.396 The facts 
of the case were briefly as follows: The Schooner “Exchange” owned by two 
American citizens was seized by French man-of-war. She was assigned to the 
French fleet even though France and America were not at war. The former 
American owners filed a libel in the US against the schooner, alleging that 
they were the true owners.397 The case ended up in the US Supreme Court. 
The decision of the court seemed to clearly enunciate the principle of the law 
of the flag.398 The court held that the jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible to no limitation, 
not imposed by itself.399 
After noting the immunity of jurisdiction Chief Justice Marshall went on further 
and held:  
A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his 
territorial jurisdiction is, where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass 
through his dominions… The grant of a free passage… implies a waiver of all 
jurisdiction over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign 
general to use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the 
government of his army may require.400 
This dictum by Chief Justice Marshall was followed in the US to mean that 
visiting friendly forces are absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of the 
receiving state.401 
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 Ibid n 387 supra. See also Id n 391 supra at 13.  
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 Ibid n 387 supra. See also Id n 391 supra at 13–4. 
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 Id n 391 supra at 14. 
399
 Id n 387 supra at para 136. See also Id n 391 supra at 14. The court further reason that 
this absolute an exclusive right to jurisdiction could be limited by consent either express or 
implied. 
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Id n 387 supra at para 139. See also Id n 391 at 14. See further Baxter 1958 (7) The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 72. Available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/755648. (Date used 18/08/12). 
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 Id n 391 supra at 15. See also Id 391 supra at 12. For an analysis and misconception 
created by the Schooner case see Baxter 1958 (7) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly Id n 400 supra at 72–3. 
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6.2.2 The Agreement between the USA and the UK of 1942402 
In the UK the presence of the American forces was mandated by the United 
States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942.403 The Act did not per se 
address the question of criminal jurisdiction of American forces while 
stationed in the UK. The question of criminal jurisdiction was addressed in the 
notes annexed to the Act.404 The annexure provided that: 
Subject as hereinafter provided, no criminal proceeding shall be prosecuted in 
the United Kingdom before any court of the United Kingdom against a 
member of the military or naval forces of the United States of America.405 
In terms of the aforementioned paragraph the American forces were 
subjected to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the American authorities 
while stationed in the United Kingdom during World War II.406 
6.3 United Kingdom 
6.3.1 Criminal Jurisdiction under Agreements entered into by the United 
Kingdom and other States prior to the conclusion of NATO SoFA 
The United Kingdom has been consistent in asserting its territorial 
sovereignty. As early as 1917 it has insisted that the only right of jurisdiction 
that could be granted would relate to the offence committed within visiting 
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 The agreement was concluded as a result of US declaring war on Germany (World War II). 
This necessitated American troops to be stationed in the UK. Thus the question of criminal 
jurisdiction over American Forces came up hence the agreement. 
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 Hansard, HC (series 5) Vol. 382, vol 877 (4 August 1942). Available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1942/aug/04/united-states-of-america-visiting-
forces#column_877. (Date used 14/01/14). See also Baxter 1958 (7) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly Id n 400 at 73. 
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 Based on its traditional approach the US claimed exclusive right of jurisdiction over the 
members of its forces. See also Id n 386 supra at 24. See also the notes of Secretary of State 
for the Home Department introducing the United State of America (Visiting Forces) Bill, 
Hansard, HC (series 5) Vol. 382, vol 877 (4 august 1942). Available at 
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 Ibid. See also Baxter 1958 (7) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Id n 400 
supra at 73. 
406
 The concession was considered as to be a considerable departure from the traditional 
system and practice (territorial sovereignty) of the United Kingdom. The concession was 
made due to the weak UK bargaining position at the time (Id n 386 supra at 24–5 and Id n 50 
supra at 15).  
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forces establishment.407 However, at times it was willing to apply the law of 
the flag.408  
The presence of the Allied Forces in the UK was authorised by the Allied 
Forces Act of 1940. The Act gave jurisdiction to the Allied Military Courts only 
on matters of discipline and administration of that force. Concurrent 
jurisdiction was conferred over offences punishable under the law of both the 
sending state and the receiving state. However, crimes of murder and rape 
were subjected to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the United Kingdom 
courts.409 
6.4 Criminal Jurisdiction under Agreement between the Parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces (hereinafter 
NATO SoFA)410 
The status of force agreement was signed to give effect to the North Atlantic 
Treaty which was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The treaty envisaged 
the fact that forces of one party may be sent by arrangement to serve in the 
territory of another party.411 It was thought prudent to formalise this 
arrangement in a multilateral status of forces agreement as opposed to 
bilateral agreements.412 The agreement followed the Brussels Treaty and the 
conditions prevailing in Western Europe at that time that territorial principle 
should control these agreements and the visiting forces should not enjoy 
blanket immunity.413 The NATO SoFA defines the status of NATO forces while 
stationed in the territory of another NATO contracting party.414 
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recognised the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunals of their respective forces over their 
members, in whatever territory and of whatever nationality the accused may be. 
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 Id n 391 supra at 24. 
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 Id n 391 supra at 63. 
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 Id n 391 supra at 45. 
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 Preamble to NATO SoFA. Available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm. (Date used 14/12/13). 
92 
 
Criminal jurisdiction is regulated by Article VII.415 Article VII(1)(a) of NATO 
SoFA provides: 
The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise 
within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on 
them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military 
law of that State.416 
This paragraph serves the purpose of stating certain general rules between 
the sending and the receiving state;417 it does not per se address the question 
of the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction.  
Article VII(1)(b) of NATO SoFA provides: 
The authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members 
of a force… with respect to offences committed within the territory of the 
receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.418 
The aforementioned sub-paragraphs recognise the right of receiving state to 
enjoy broad jurisdiction by virtue of its prerogatives as a territorial 
sovereign.419 Both sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the aforesaid article 
contemplate that a state whose law has been violated would have exclusive 
jurisdiction.420  
Article VII(2)(a) of the NATO SoFA provides that: 
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 Ibid. See also Id n 391 supra at 133.The objective of this article is to assure the orderly 
disposition of criminal offences committed within the territory of the receiving state by the 
member of the force. 
416
 Article VII(1)(a) of NATO SoFA. See also Id n 386 supra at 133–134. The word “military 
authorities of the sending state” have a broad meaning and include military courts as well as 
authorities of the sending state that exercise administrative and disciplinary powers. See 
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authority over its armed forces (enforcement of discipline) outside of its territory and the right 
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 Article VII(1)(b) of NATO SoFA. See also Id n 386 supra at 133. See also Baxter 1958 (7) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Id n 400 supra at 74. 
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 Ibid n 391 supra. 
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 Id n 391 supra at 133. Only the military authorities of sending state will have some form of 
jurisdiction to try specified offences. If the members of visiting force commit a crime which the 
receiving state has jurisdiction they will be tried under normal domestic criminal procedures 
and courts. 
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The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with 
respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by 
the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.421 
In terms of the aforesaid sub-paragraph the military authorities of the sending 
state have exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces as it is the only state 
which has an interest in the matter i.e. the purported action will not be 
injurious to the receiving state. The rationale behind this exclusive jurisdiction 
might be that each military force has an inherent right to manage and enforce 
discipline within its ranks.422 Only persons subjected to military law423 of the 
sending state will be prosecuted and only for certain offences.424 
Article VII(2)(b) of the NATO SoFA provides: 
The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over members of a force… with respect to offences, including offences 
relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law, but not by the law of the 
sending state.
425
 
If a member of the sending force commits an offence which is only an offence 
in terms of the receiving state law, he/she will be tried by the receiving state 
only. In this case the receiving state is the only state which is having an 
interest. 
Where the alleged conduct constitutes at the same time an offence in terms of 
the law of both the receiving and sending state, these give rise to co-existing 
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International and Comparative Law Quarterly Id n 397 supra at 74. 
94 
 
jurisdiction. In order to resolve the problem of concurrent jurisdiction, the 
NATO SoFA sets up a system of primary and secondary jurisdiction.426 Article 
VII(3) of the NATO SoFA provides:  
1. In case where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following 
rules shall apply:  
a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary 
right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a 
civilian component in relation to  
i. offences solely against the property or security of that 
State, or offences solely against the person or property of 
another member of the force or civilian component of that 
State or of a dependant;  
ii. offences arising out of any act or omission done in the 
performance of official duty.427 
In terms of the aforementioned paragraph both states have the right to 
exercise jurisdiction. To break the deadlock (concurrent jurisdiction) the 
agreement firstly looks at the states’ interests by applying a system of 
priorities. Once it is has been established which state has greater interest i.e. 
the offence involves its personnel, property et cetera, then that state is 
conferred with primary right to exercise jurisdiction.428  
Secondly, all offences committed in the performance of official duty are 
prioritised in favour of the sending state. The reason being, the soldier in the 
performance of official duty is seen to be carrying out instructions received 
from the sending state and that the sending state may not be brought before 
the courts of the receiving state.429 
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Where the offence is not solely against the personnel or property of the 
sending state or where the offence has not been committed in the 
performance of official duty the authorities of the receiving state shall have the 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction.430 In this instance the receiving state has 
more interest or put differently, the right to exercise jurisdiction is prioritised in 
favour of the receiving state, hence the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.431 
Where the state having primary right to exercise jurisdiction decide not to 
exercise jurisdiction, it must notify the authorities of the other state of their 
intentions as soon as possible. Furthermore, the other state can request the 
state which holds the primary right to jurisdiction to give up its right to primary 
jurisdiction in favour of the former.432 In all the cases where a state has the 
primary right to jurisdiction it can waive that right in favour of the state which is 
not entitled to the primary right to jurisdiction.433 
With regard to sentencing the NATO SoFA holds that where a person is 
convicted by the sending state in the territory of the receiving state, a death 
sentence shall not be carried out by the authorities of the sending state if 
legislation of the receiving state does not provide for such sentence in similar 
                                                                                                                                            
host nation of a sending state certificate as to the official duty (in Wilson v. Girard, 354 US 
Supreme Court 1957 case the Japanese authorities did not accept the US authorities 
certificate that the incident involving a US serviceman, Girard arouse out of the performance 
of official duty).  Secondly, by judicious use of the waiver provision of the agreements (id n 
391 supra at 111). See also Baxter 1958 (52) American Society of International Law at 175. 
Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25657410. (Date used 20/12/13). 
430
 Article VII(3)(b) of NATO SoFA. See also Id n 391 supra at 161 and 193–4. In this case 
jurisdiction will be based on the principle of territorial sovereignty.  
431
 Ibid n 412 supra.  
432
 Article VII(3)(c) of NATO SoFA. The state with primary right to jurisdiction shall give 
sympathetic consideration to the request by the other state.  
433
 Ibid. See also Id n 391 supra at 194–5. See further Id n 50 supra at 112–3 and 126. This 
procedure is called waiver and it allows flexibility that may be necessary in certain 
circumstances. The waiver may be obtained either by way of general agreement or by 
negotiations on a case by case basis. United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, Volume 6, Part 1 (University of Michigan Libraries 1955) at 106 annex. Para 3. 
provides that the Netherlands authorities, recognising that it is the primary responsibilities of 
the United States authorities, to maintain good order and discipline where person subjected to 
United States military law are concerned, will, upon the request of the United States 
authorities, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article VII, except where 
they determine that it is of particular importance that jurisdiction be exercise by the 
Netherlands authorities. 
96 
 
cases.434 This provision does not however preclude the authorities of the 
sending state from executing the death sentence in its own territory.435  
Cases which are contentious with regard to the death sentence are the so-
called inter se offences which only involved personnel of the sending state, for 
example a sending state soldier brutally murdering a fellow sending state 
soldier. In this case the sending state has the primary right to jurisdiction. If 
the death sentence is a competent verdict in terms of the sending state’s 
legislation it might be carried out or pronounced in the territory of the receiving 
state.436 This will in turn trigger the provision of Article VII(7)(a) of NATO SoFA 
which prohibits the death sentence in the territory of the receiving state by the 
authorities of the sending state if legislation of the receiving state does not 
provide for such sentence in similar cases. 
6.5 Agreements entered into between the United States of America 
and other States after the conclusion of NATO SoFA  
The USA has concluded quite a number of bilateral agreements with other 
states after the coming into effect of NATO SoFA.437 Its attitudes seem to treat 
the NATO SoFA as an acceptable minimum in respect of criminal jurisdiction. 
It tries to keep exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces most of the times.438 
The Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands439 provides:  
The Netherlands authorities… will, upon the request of the United States 
authorities, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article VII, 
except where they determine that it is of particular importance that  
jurisdiction be exercised by the Netherlands authorities…440 
The above paragraph seems to suggest that the Netherlands authorities will 
try cases in exceptional circumstances only. Cases will be prioritised in favour 
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of the US authorities.441 However, in the final analysis the US does not have 
an exclusive right to jurisdiction, this right is shared (concurrent) with the 
Netherlands. 
The agreement between the United States and Greece442 is similar to the 
Netherlands agreement.443 Article II provides: 
The Greek authorities… will, upon the request of the United States 
authorities, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article VII, 
paragraph 3(c) of that Agreement, except where they determine that it is of 
particular importance that  jurisdiction be exercised by the Greek 
authorities…444 
The conclusion which can be reached from the aforementioned paragraph 
tend to suggest that the Greek authorities, like their Netherlands counterparts, 
will only exercise jurisdiction in exceptional cases; however, that does not 
mean that the United States has exclusive right to jurisdiction either.445 The 
two countries have the right to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.446 
6.6. Attitude of the United Kingdom towards Status of Force 
Agreement after the Conclusion of NATO SoFA 
The United Kingdom has been consistent in its assertion of the right to 
territorial sovereignty.447 Equally so it recognises the right of other states to 
territorial sovereignty. Thus the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill 
1995/96 in the UK was informed that the UK’s aim in negotiating a status of 
force agreement was: 
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Normally to secure arrangements which allow the UK service authorities to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over UK personnel, but this cannot always be 
achieved, either because the receiving state cannot make such concession 
for legal reason or because the authorities are not prepared to do so. As a 
minimum we would aim to secure concurrent jurisdiction, as in the NATO 
SoFA, but there have been variation which allowed exclusive UK jurisdiction 
in military exercise areas or over offences committed in the course of duty.448 
In terms of this report the UK will try to secure Status of Force Agreements 
which will confer exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces, however, the 
NATO SoFA (concurrent jurisdiction) will always be the basis for those 
agreements. The UK will never go below the protection afforded by NATO 
SoFA. 
6.7 Conclusion 
During World War I the law of the flag dominated i.e. the sending states had 
exclusive jurisdiction over their armed forces.449 In the United States this was 
heavily influenced by the interpretation or rather misinterpretation given to the 
Schooner case.450 However, the United Kingdom insisted as early as 1917 
that the territorial principle should govern these agreements.451 
During World War II concurrent jurisdiction came to be accepted as the 
acceptable arrangement as the right of the receiving state to territorial 
sovereignty and the right of the sending state to exercise disciplinary authority 
over its forces were recognised.452 The only state which was reluctant was the 
United States. However, it too conceded that concurrent jurisdiction was the 
only acceptable arrangement.453 
With the signing of the NATO SoFA the principle of concurrent jurisdiction 
became entrenched.454 Later the NATO SoFA became the basis for future 
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bilateral agreements. Another observation is that the powerful nations seem to 
use their bargaining powers to secure more favourable concessions from the 
weaker nations.455 
State sovereignty, especially territorial sovereignty, plays a crucial role in 
international law. States jealously protect this right. Any interference by 
external forces in the internal affairs of another state is viewed as a violation 
of this right and normally is met with fierce criticism and resistance. However, 
states have come to realise that the need for cooperation is inevitable. During 
this cooperation the need to balance conflicting rights will arise. 
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CHAPTER 7 
BALANCING OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS OF STATES (LIMITATION OF 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY) DURING PEACEFUL MILITARY COOPERATION  
7.1 Introduction  
It is an established principle of international law that sovereignty is 
fundamental and a necessary characteristic of statehood.456 Sovereignty 
intrinsically embodies the supreme authority of the state within its territorial 
sphere excluding dependence on any other authority, in particular another 
state.457 
The concept of sovereignty is closely related to the Treaty of Westphalia. After 
the signing of this Treaty, the principle of state sovereignty became 
entrenched and was understood to be absolute.458 The rationale, at that time, 
in entrenching the absoluteness of state sovereignty was to try and prevent 
future wars.459 However, peace was never restored as manifested later by the 
French Revolution, followed by World War I and later World War II. After 
these wars the whole of the international community was almost unanimous in 
questioning the absoluteness of state sovereignty as most of these wars were 
waged in the name of state sovereignty.460 
7.2 Limitation of State Sovereignty during the period 1530–1596  
According to Bodin and Hobbes’ exposition of sovereignty, the concept of 
sovereignty as absolute power was mainly focused on issues related to 
domestic affairs.461 Their writing was mainly influenced by religious wars 
which were fought during that time in France and Britain. Their main purpose 
was to establish a basis for order in the two countries and to discourage any 
challenge to authority.462 However, in the final analysis Bodin conceded that 
this absolute power might well be limited by both the divine and customary 
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laws of the political community.463 Equally so Hobbes admitted that a 
government would lose its legitimacy if it failed to protect its subjects.464 It can 
therefore be concluded from the writings of these two authors that sovereignty 
was never absolute, it was limited. 
According to Pufendorf sovereignty was never absolute; it was always limited 
by positive law.465 Grotius too argued that state sovereignty was limited by 
natural law and by agreements entered into with other sovereign states.466 
Again, it can be concluded from these two writers that sovereignty was never 
absolute; it was always subjected to some limitation i.e. by both positive and 
treaty law. 
7.3 Limitation of state sovereignty prior to and during World War I 
Peaceful military occupation was practically unknown before 1914. Before this 
time it was only the passing through or the brief stationing of allied or friendly 
forces on a given territory.467 For example, Prussian territories were not 
contiguous, Prussian forces had, in order to go from one garrison to another, 
pass through foreign territories. In order to regulate the condition of passage 
and the status of its forces, an agreement was then signed.468  
The question whether there was, in the period around World War I, a rule of 
customary international law in respect of which visiting forces were subjected 
to exclusive jurisdiction of their sending state while in the territory of the 
receiving state, was unclear;469 Barton thought that there existed a rule of 
international law according to which members of visiting forces were, in 
principle, subjected to criminal jurisdiction of the local courts.470 Lazareff, after 
studying the decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 
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Casablanca,471 Schooner Exchange,472 the Coleman v Tennessee,473 Tucker 
v Alenxendroff474 and Panama475 cases, agreed with Barton that there was no 
absolute right of immunity of jurisdiction of a peaceful occupation force over 
its members. According to Lazareff, the decisions in the aforementioned 
cases did not per se confer exclusive jurisdiction to the sending state, the 
waiver of the right by the host nation implied only offences against the 
discipline of that force, the territorial sovereign in all this cases reserved to 
himself the right to exercise his sovereignty whenever an offence had been 
committed against territorial law.476 Stanger too holds that the decision in the 
Schooner Exchange case did not lay down a principle of international law 
conferring absolute immunity to the visiting forces, the decision in this case 
was based on military exigency at the time.477  
Wijewardane on the other hand, after a detailed study of agreements entered 
into during the period around World War I,478 concluded that there was a 
customary rule of international law that members of visiting forces are immune 
from criminal jurisdiction of the host state in respect of offences committed in 
the territory of the host state.479  
From the above analysis it cannot be concluded that there was a rule of 
international law conferring exclusive criminal jurisdiction on the sending state 
over its forces in the territory of the receiving state during peace time.480 
In the absence of any rule of international law with regard to criminal 
jurisdiction of forces stationed abroad during peace time, the admission of a 
force in the territory of the receiving state will be regulated by agreement. 
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When states enter into agreements to station their forces in either country, the 
basic principle of territorial sovereignty comes into play.481 The full application 
of this principle would result in the receiving state having a general right of 
jurisdiction over members of visiting forces on the assumption that a 
sovereign state could not accept not to punish an offence committed on its 
territory, lest it will be a violation of its sovereignty.482 Furthermore, a 
sovereign state could not allow a foreign jurisdiction to exercise its 
competence within its territory. However, this approach of absolute right to 
territorial sovereignty was never accepted.483 
The decision to admit a foreign force is normally embodied in an agreement 
referred to as a status of force agreement which defines the rights and 
obligation of the visiting force.484 Agreements entered into during World War I 
were dominated by the principle of the law of the flag485 i.e. the sending states 
had exclusive jurisdiction over their forces who were stationed abroad.486 
Therefore, the principle of territorial sovereignty was limited in that the foreign 
forces could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their forces in the territory of 
the receiving state.487 The receiving state had no authority over visiting things 
and persons in its territory. 
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7.4 Limitations of state sovereignty by agreements entered into 
during World War II and agreements concluded immediately thereafter 
During World War II the Allied Forces were stationed in the UK until “D” Day. 
Their presence in the UK was regulated by the Allied Forces Act.488 The Act 
departed from the position established by World War I in that it gave 
concurrent jurisdiction to both the sending and the receiving states. The 
principle of territorial sovereignty gained ground in that the sending states 
could only exercise authority in matters concerning discipline and internal 
administration of that force, in all other matters the receiving state had 
jurisdiction.489 The Allied Act balanced the conflicting rights of both the 
sending and the receiving by on the one hand recognising the right of the 
receiving state to territorial sovereignty and on the other hand the right of the 
sending state to exercise some form of authority over its armed forces. 
Therefore, in this case state sovereignty was also limited and extended by 
agreement.  
The only agreement which departed from the position established by the 
Allied Forces Act was the agreement between the USA and the UK.490 This 
agreement conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over its armed 
forces.491 Again in this case, state sovereignty was limited and extended by 
agreement i.e. the UK’s right to territorial sovereignty was limited, it could not 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over things and persons in its territory whereas 
the USA extended its laws (sovereignty) beyond its borders.492 
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With the signing of NATO SoFA, the principle established by the Allied Forces 
Act became entrenched. Concurrent jurisdiction became the accepted 
norm.493 Even the USA which initially favoured exclusive jurisdiction, 
reluctantly accepted this arrangement.494 Territorial sovereignty was observed 
in that the receiving state could exercise some form of jurisdiction over things 
and persons in its territory. Equally so, the sending state could exercise some 
form of jurisdiction over its forces in the territory of the receiving state.495 
Again in this case, state sovereignty was limited and extended by agreement. 
7.5. The Limitation of state sovereignty as result of atrocities 
committed during World War II and thereafter 
Due to the atrocities committed496 and the palpable destruction caused by 
World War II, the Westphalian system of state sovereignty came under critical 
criticism and was finally laid to rest.497 After the war the Major Allied Powers 
took a decision to establish tribunals to try those who committed the worst 
kind of atrocities in the history of civilised mankind.498 This resulted in the 
establishment of both the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg499 
(hereinafter the Nuremberg Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East500 (hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal) to try major identified war 
criminals for crimes committed within their territory and beyond. 
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The Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals were land mark events in the 
development of international law. They pierced the veil of state sovereignty in 
that claims of absolute state sovereignty gave in to the international 
community’s claim of peace and justice.501 The trials marked a major turning 
point for the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, clipping its all-
encompassing principle of political independence and territorial 
sovereignty.502 The trials buried the notion of national sovereignty as 
recognised at Westphalia; states were now subjected to international norms 
and standards, universal claims for peace and the inviolability of human 
rights.503 
More recently the principles established by the Nuremberg and the Tokyo 
tribunals were invoked and applied to prosecute those who committed 
atrocities in former Yugoslavia504 and Rwanda.505 Persons who committed 
atrocities in their territories could not rely on territorial sovereignty to avoid 
prosecution.506 These international penal processes represent a shift in the 
authority from states to international community.507 
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With the establishment of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the 
ICC)508 the circle that began with the creation of the post-World War II ad hoc 
international military tribunals has been completed.509 Sovereignty has been 
limited from both within and outside the state. The concept of international 
penal process has been increasingly recognised as a triumph over the right of 
a state to hold sole rights in the exercise of certain prerogatives.510 
7.6 The limitation of state sovereignty under the UN Charter and the 
Declaration and Treaty of SADC of 1992 
The UN Charter511 recognises the principle of state sovereignty.  Article 2(1) 
provides that the Charter is based on the principle of sovereign equality. It 
further holds that the UN and member states should refrain from interfering in 
the internal affairs of another state.512 However, if actions of states are 
adjudged to be a threat to peace or acts of aggression, the UN will interfere, 
and thus limit the principle of state sovereignty.  
Article 2(1) was recently invoked to adopt the UN Security Council Resolution 
1973 (2011) which authorised the Security Council to take enforcement action 
against the Libyan government. The resolution authorised by the UN to take 
all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack by the 
Qadhafi regime and its supporters.513 In this case, the actions of the Libyan 
government were adjudged to be inter alia a threat to international peace, 
thus in direct violation of Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. In this case the right of 
Libya to territorial sovereignty was therefore limited by the rules of 
international law.  
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Another factor which limits the principle of state sovereignty is the human 
rights regime. The human rights regime consists of overlapping global, 
regional, and national conventions and institutions.514 There is a tendency in 
most human rights agreements that a legitimate state must be a state that 
upholds certain core democratic values.515 By insisting on certain core 
democratic values these human rights agreements places governments under 
a new system of legal regulations which is inconsistent with the Westphalian 
conception of sovereignty.516 For example, the African (Banjul) Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights (hereinafter the Banjul Charter) authorises a 
state to draw the attention of another state which it reasonably suspects of 
violating the Charter and to simultaneously report the matter to the secretary 
and the chairperson of the OAU [African Union].517 Equally so the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
was designed to take steps towards collective enforcement of human 
rights.518 This means that member states of these two agreements will 
interfere if they reasonably suspect that there are serious human rights 
violations in one of the member states. 
The above analysis means the international community will interfere in the 
internal affairs of states if states fail to protect and/or violate certain 
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fundamental human rights of citizens. One of the reasons why the UN 
intervened in the Libyan case was the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights of citizens by the Qadhafi regime.519 By intervening the 
international community was in fact prescribing to Libya how it must treat its 
own citizens. Again in this instance the action (sovereignty) of Libya was 
limited by international law (human rights regime). 
The SADC Treaty520 is not explicit with regard to limitation of state 
sovereignty; it only obliges member states to act in accordance with sovereign 
equality.521 The SADC Protocol522 on the other hand purports to define 
sovereignty in terms of its traditional Westphalian meaning.523 Subsequent to 
the signing of the SADC Protocol a memorandum of understanding (SADC 
MoU) was signed enabling SADC member states to schedule and participated 
in multinational exercises as part of the SADC Standby Brigade.524 During 
these exercises all the SADC countries, except for Botswana and South 
Africa, agreed that the sending and the host state will share criminal 
jurisdiction, i.e. the sending state had jurisdiction on the so called “on duty 
offences” and the host nation had jurisdiction on all other offences.525 In all 
these multinational exercises sovereignty was limited and extended by 
agreement. 
Also by reaffirming the principle of good neighbourliness and interdependence 
is by implication an indication that SADC member states will be prepared to 
limit some of their sovereign rights. They will refrain from actions which might 
damage their good neighbourliness and interdependencies.526 Furthermore, 
the SADC Treaty is an international instrument and it is signed in furtherance 
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of Chapter III, Article 52 of the UN Charter,527 which means it is international 
law by its very nature. Therefore, during the application of the SADC Treaty, 
SADC member states’ sovereignty will be limited by international law i.e. their 
action cannot be a threat to peace, breaches of peace and acts of 
aggression.528 
7.7 Conclusion   
The concept of state sovereignty emanated with the signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia.529 It was conceived at the time to mean absoluteness i.e. states 
had the right to do as they wish within their territories; they will not tolerate 
any outside interference. At that time it made sense as Europe had just 
experienced one of the most brutal wars.530 The signatories to the Treaty 
thought that by entrenching the principle of absolute state sovereignty, peace 
will prevail amongst states.531 
During the period 1530–1596 there was never unanimity amongst the authors 
with regard to the exact ambit of state sovereignty, some argued that state 
sovereignty was absolute while others thought not.532 However, in the final 
analysis, even the proponents of absolute state sovereignty conceded that 
state sovereignty might be limited in certain exceptional circumstances.533 
During World War I the rights of the receiving state to territorial sovereignty 
was limited in that the sending state could exercise exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction within the territory of the receiving state. The receiving state could 
not try members of foreign armed forces who committed offences within their 
territory.534 During World War II the sending and the receiving state had 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction. The sending state had jurisdiction over 
offences which were only related to the discipline and internal administration 
of that force. The receiving state exercised the right to criminal jurisdiction in 
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all other offences.535 Thus, in this case too, sovereignty was limited and 
extended. 
After World War II states could not rely on their sovereignty to avoid external 
interference. Those who committed serious atrocities within and outside their 
territory were held responsible by ad hoc international criminal tribunals. The 
Westphalian notion of state sovereignty was finally buried.536 Furthermore, 
after World War II the institution of human rights gained ground and states 
were obliged to guarantee certain inviolable fundamental rights. This process 
eroded the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty even further.537 
With the signing of the NATO SoFA, concurrent criminal jurisdiction became 
the accepted minimum norm. Some stronger nations tended to try and obtain 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their forces, however, at the end they too 
conceded that the principle established by NATO SoFA was the acceptable 
arrangement.538 Again in this case state sovereignty could be extended and 
limited by agreement. 
The UN Charter recognises and acknowledges the principle of sovereign 
equality. State sovereignty is observed provided it is not against the principles 
of international law. If the actions of the state threaten peace or are acts of 
aggression the UN will intervene and thus limit state sovereignty.539 The 
SADC Treaty and Protocol purport to support absolute state sovereignty. 
However, the SADC Treaty is an international instrument and furthermore it 
was concluded in furtherance of Chapter III, Article 52 of the UN Charter 
meaning it cannot be a threat to peace or act of aggression in its 
application.540 
From the above analysis it can be concluded that state sovereignty was never 
absolute; it could be limited and extended by treaty law and customary law. 
Furthermore, there is no principle of international law dealing with criminal 
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jurisdiction of visiting forces during peace time. When the concept of state 
sovereignty is applied to the stationing of forces during peace time, the 
following conclusions can be reached; firstly during World War I the sending 
state had exclusive jurisdiction over its armed forces; secondly during World 
War II and immediately thereafter, concurrent jurisdiction became the 
accepted norm.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of state sovereignty is closely related to the signing of the Treaty 
of Westphalia. It was understood to confer absolute power on the state. 
States were free from any external interference; they could do as they wished 
within their territories. Authors of that time were never unanimous with regard 
to the exact ambit of state sovereignty; some argued that sovereignty was 
absolute while others thought not. 
Intrinsically linked with the principle of state sovereignty is the right of states to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction. Five principles are recognised under 
contemporary international law on which states could exercise criminal 
jurisdiction namely: territoriality principle, nationality principle, passive 
personality theory, protective principle and universal jurisdiction. The state 
has the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction based on the aforementioned 
principles by virtue of it being sovereign. 
When peace could not be maintained through the principle of absolute state 
sovereignty, the principle started losing its traditional meaning. Its 
absoluteness was questioned; the freedom of states to do as they wished in 
the name of sovereignty could no longer be tolerated by the international 
community. The international community was almost unanimous in that there 
should be some higher norms (natural law) in which all nations should 
conform. 
After World War II and the consequential atrocities committed, the victors 
established ad hoc military tribunals to try those they have identified to have 
committed war crimes. The establishment of ad hoc military tribunals and 
more recently the ICC was the final nail into the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty. 
The principle of sovereignty is equally captured by the UN Charter. However, 
the UN (and by extension the SADC Treaty) never understood the concept of 
state sovereignty to be absolute; it was always limited by international law. 
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Furthermore, the international community has come to accept that there are 
certain fundamental human rights of which all nations should adhere to. 
These human rights regimes further eroded the state-centric notion of 
sovereignty. As it stands the concept of state sovereignty is not understood to 
be absolute, it is limited by international law and the rights of other states. 
Botswana and South Africa are sovereign states; they have the right to 
territorial integrity. In their exercise of territorial integrity they can decide to 
hang or not to hang their citizens. They are free to enter into agreements with 
other states. They can limit or extend their sovereign rights by agreement. 
However, their freedom of action is not absolute if it is limited by the rights of 
other nations and agreements entered into with other states, furthermore their 
actions must not be a threat to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of 
aggression i.e. their actions should not be against international law.  
One of the main reasons why states enter into agreements is the need for 
peace and security. The need for international (regional) peace resulted in the 
formation of the UN (SADC). The UN is currently the epicentre of the 
maintenance of international peace. Generally, the UN operates in unstable 
and conflict areas. In pursuit of this international peace, the UN is sometimes 
called upon to send troops to conflict areas.  
Legislation of both Botswana and South Africa authorises the two countries to 
enter into agreements in fulfilment of an international obligation. Botswana 
and South Africa are signatories to the SADC Treaty (in furtherance of the 
purpose of the UN) with the purpose of fulfilling their international obligations. 
With the signing of the SADC Treaty, it was inevitable that the armed forces of 
both South Africa and Botswana will find themselves in the territory of one 
another during peace time. Once in the territory of another the question of 
criminal jurisdiction becomes critical. Who will exercise criminal jurisdiction if a 
soldier of either Botswana or South Africa commits a serious offence, like 
murder, while in the territory of the receiving state (taking into account that 
Botswana still practices the death sentence)?  
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Any agreement between the two countries is by its very nature an 
international instrument. It should reflect the sentiments of the international 
community or rather the sentiments of the international community should lay 
the basis for such an agreement. The international sentiments with regard to 
visiting forces during peace time are mainly captured in customs, the UN 
SoFA for Peace Keeping Operation, agreements signed before and after the 
end of both World Wars in relation to stationing of armed forces abroad and 
the writings of distinguished scholars of international law. 
Agreements entered into during and after World War I but before World War II 
were dominated by the law of the flag. The exigencies of war combined with 
the power balances at that time necessitated exclusive criminal jurisdiction in 
favour of the sending state. Since the end of World War I circumstances have 
changed and it will not be prudent for Botswana and South Africa to follow this 
approach. It made sense then, but will not necessarily make sense now. 
Furthermore, this approach was never accepted as being a rule of 
international law and some states always insisted on their right to territorial 
sovereignty. 
Agreements entered into just before and during World War II conferred 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction on both the sending and the receiving state. 
Two principles became clear during these agreements, firstly the right of the 
sending state to exercise jurisdiction only in matters of discipline and 
administration of the force, secondly the right of the receiving state to 
territorial integrity, i.e. the right to exercise jurisdiction in all other matters. The 
approach followed in these agreements was widely accepted by many states.  
If Botswana and South Africa intend to sign an agreement, the aforesaid 
approach may lay the foundation for such an agreement as it was widely 
accepted. If the principles enunciated in those agreements are applied to 
Botswana and South Africa it will translate into the following: If the SANDF is 
sent to Botswana during peace time it will be able to exercise authority only in 
matters of discipline and administration of the force. Botswana will be able to 
exercise jurisdiction in all other matters. The same applies to the BDF while in 
South Africa. Exactly what will constitute matters of discipline and 
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administration of the force can be explained within the agreement. Serious 
criminal offences, for example rape or murder of a civilian, will definitely not 
fall within “discipline and administration” and thus the receiving state will have 
the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction.  
The UN SoFA for Peace Keeping Operations (hereinafter PKO) is an 
agreement concluded between the UN and the receiving state prior to the UN 
sending troops to that receiving state. The receiving state during PKO is 
generally in a weaker bargaining position to assert its territorial sovereignty, 
hence the PKO. As an incentive to contribute resources to the UN PKO, troop 
contributing states retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction over their armed 
forces. Botswana and South Africa participated in quite a few UN PKOs and in 
these operations they retained exclusive criminal jurisdiction. 
If Botswana and South Africa want to sign an agreement with regard to the 
stationing of their armed forces on each other’s territory during peace time, 
the UN SoFA will not be an appropriate basis for such an agreement. Both 
Botswana and South Africa are stable and their criminal justice systems are 
functional and both countries apply their domestic laws meticulously. There is 
no basis in international law for the two countries to claim exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction over their forces while they are in each other’s territory during 
peace time. Furthermore, they are in a good bargaining position to assert their 
sovereignty; in fact exclusive criminal jurisdiction will tend to assail the 
principle of territorial integrity.  
Agreements signed after World War II, notably the NATO SoFA, entrench the 
approach which prevailed during World War II. Concurrent jurisdiction became 
the accepted norm. Another innovation with regard to the NATO SoFA is that 
where states had concurrent jurisdiction a system of priorities was introduced. 
The state which the action is more injurious to has the primary right to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction and the state which the action is less injurious to 
has a secondary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the state 
which has the primary right to criminal jurisdiction may waive that right in 
favour of the state not having that primary right to jurisdiction. 
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The NATO SoFA seems to be widely accepted beyond NATO countries. 
Botswana and South Africa can seriously consider this agreement as the 
basis for future agreements. If they do consider this agreement it will translate 
into the following: Firstly, if (for example) a SANDF member commits a 
serious offence such as the murder of a fellow SANDF member while being 
stationed on a SANDF base in Botswana, both Botswana and South Africa 
will have concurrent jurisdiction to try that person. However, jurisdiction can 
be prioritised in favour of South Africa as this offence is against a SANDF 
member, committed by a SANDF member on a SANDF base, put differently 
the SANDF (South Africa) has the right to primary jurisdiction. Secondly, if the 
said SANDF member (for example) rapes and murders a Botswana civilian, 
both Botswana and South Africa will have concurrent jurisdiction to try the 
member. However, jurisdiction will be prioritised in favour of Botswana as the 
said offence is more injurious to Botswana than South Africa, i.e. it is against 
a Botswana civilian, in Botswana territory and Botswana therefore has the 
primary right to exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, both countries can waive 
their right to primary jurisdiction in favour of another, and both can be 
encouraged to give sympathetic consideration to such requests. 
With regard to sentencing the NATO SoFA holds that the death sentence 
should not be carried out in the territory of the receiving state if the laws of the 
receiving state do not provide for that sentence. If we apply this principle to 
BDF and SANDF it will translate into the following: If for example a BDF 
member while in South Africa commits mutiny and he is tried by a Botswana 
military court in South Africa, and is found guilty and sentenced to death, he 
will not be hanged in South Africa; however, nothing prevents (BDF) 
Botswana from hanging its own member back home. 
Closely related to sentencing, South Africa may try to obtain favourable 
concession (assurance) from Botswana especially with regard to the death 
sentence. It may request Botswana that if a SANDF member gets convicted 
of, for example murder, while in Botswana, he/she will not be sentenced to 
death or if sentenced to death the penalty will not be carried out. South Africa 
will have a strong case in this regard as there is a strong movement among 
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the international community towards the abolition of (and/or moratorium on) 
the death sentence.  
From the above analysis it has been shown that state sovereignty plays a 
pivotal role in international law even though the exact meaning of the concept 
remains elusive. Treaty law remains one of the important sources of 
international law as manifested in different agreements. Furthermore, states 
are required to observe and act in accordance with international norms and 
standards. Botswana and South Africa are sovereign states and both states 
play crucial roles within the SADC region. Cooperation between the two 
countries is inevitable.  
Strict application of domestic laws by the two countries will not solve the 
question of criminal jurisdiction over armed forces in the territory of one 
another during peace time. The question of criminal jurisdiction over BDF and 
SANDF in each other’s territory during peace time can only be answered by 
agreement. As in any agreement, concessions have to be made. In order to 
answer and settle once and for all the question of criminal jurisdiction over 
their armed forces while in each other’s territory during peace time, Botswana 
and South Africa can take a leaf from other agreements concluded by 
developed countries especially the NATO countries with regard to their armed 
forces abroad during peace time. 
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